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Remedies for Robots* 
Mark A. Lemley† & Bryan Casey†† 
What happens when artificially intelligent robots misbehave? The question is 
not just hypothetical. As robotics and artificial intelligence systems increasingly in-
tegrate into our society, they will do bad things. We seek to explore what remedies 
the law can and should provide once a robot has caused harm. 
Remedies are sometimes designed to make plaintiffs whole by restoring them 
to the condition they would have been in “but for” the wrong. But they can also con-
tain elements of moral judgment, punishment, and deterrence. In other instances, 
the law may order defendants to do (or stop doing) something unlawful or harmful. 
Each of these goals of remedies law, however, runs into difficulties when the 
bad actor in question is neither a person nor a corporation but a robot. We might 
order a robot—or, more realistically, the designer or owner of the robot—to pay for 
the damages it causes. But it turns out to be much harder for a judge to “order” a 
robot, rather than a human, to engage in or refrain from certain conduct. Robots 
can’t directly obey court orders not written in computer code. And bridging the trans-
lation gap between natural language and code is often harder than we might expect. 
This is particularly true of modern artificial intelligence techniques that empower 
machines to learn and modify their decision-making over time. If we don’t know how 
the robot “thinks,” we won’t know how to tell it to behave in a way likely to cause it 
to do what we actually want it to do. 
Moreover, if the ultimate goal of a legal remedy is to encourage good behavior 
or discourage bad behavior, punishing owners or designers for the behavior of their 
robots may not always make sense—if only for the simple reason that their owners 
didn’t act wrongfully in any meaningful way. The same problem affects injunctive 
relief. Courts are used to ordering people and companies to do (or stop doing) certain 
things, with a penalty of contempt of court for noncompliance. But ordering a robot 
to abstain from certain behavior won’t be trivial in many cases. And ordering it to 
take affirmative acts may prove even more problematic. 
In this Article, we begin to think about how we might design a system of rem-
edies for robots. Robots will require us to rethink many of our current doctrines. They 
also offer important insights into the law of remedies we already apply to people and 
corporations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Engineers training an artificially intelligent self-flying drone 
were perplexed.1 They were trying to get the drone to stay within 
a predefined circle and to head toward its center. Things were go-
ing well for a while. The drone received positive reinforcement for 
its successful flights, and it was improving its ability to navigate 
toward the middle quickly and accurately. Then, suddenly, things 
changed. When the drone neared the edge of the circle, it would 
inexplicably turn away from the center, leaving the circle. 
What went wrong? After a long time spent puzzling over the 
problem, the designers realized that whenever the drone left the 
circle during tests, they had turned it off. Someone would then 
pick it up and carry it back into the circle to start again. From 
this pattern, the drone’s algorithm had learned—correctly—that 
when it was sufficiently far from the center, the optimal way to 
get back to the middle was to simply leave it altogether. As far as 
the drone was concerned, it had discovered a wormhole. Some-
how, flying outside of the circle could be relied upon to magically 
teleport it closer to the center. And far from violating the rules 
instilled in it by its engineers, the drone had actually followed 
them to a T. In doing so, however, it had discovered an unforeseen 
shortcut—one that subverted its designers’ true intent. 
 What happens when artificially intelligent robots don’t do 
what we expect, as the drone did here? The question is not just 
hypothetical. As robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) systems 
increasingly integrate into our society, they will do bad things. 
Sometimes they will cause harm because of a design or implemen-
tation defect: we should have programmed the self-driving car to 
recognize a graffiti-covered stop sign but failed to do so. Some-
times they will cause harm because it is an unavoidable by- 
product of the intended operation of the machine. Cars, for exam-
ple, kill thousands of people every year, sometimes unavoidably. 
Self-driving cars will too. Sometimes the accident will be caused 
by an internal logic all of its own—one that we can understand 
but that still doesn’t sit well with us. Sometimes robots will do 
the things we ask them to (minimize recidivism, for instance) but 
in ways we don’t like (such as racial profiling). And sometimes, as 
with our drone, robots will do unexpected things for reasons that 
 
 1 This example comes from a presentation at the 11th Annual Stanford Ecommerce 
Best Practices Conference in June 2014. As far as we know, it has not been previously 
described in print. 
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doubtless have their own logic, but which we either can’t under-
stand or predict. 
These new technologies present a number of interesting ques-
tions of substantive law, from predictability, to transparency, to 
liability for high-stakes decision-making in complex computa-
tional systems. A growing body of scholarship is beginning to ad-
dress these types of questions.2 Our focus here is different. We 
seek to explore what remedies the law can and should provide 
once a robot has caused harm. 
The law of remedies is transsubstantive. Whereas substan-
tive law defines who wins legal disputes, remedies law asks, 
“What do I get when I win?” Remedies are sometimes designed to 
make plaintiffs whole by restoring them to the condition they 
would have been in “but for” the wrong. But they can also contain 
elements of moral judgment, punishment, and deterrence. For in-
stance, the law will often act to deprive a defendant of its gains, 
even if the result is a windfall to the plaintiff, because we think it 
is unfair to let defendants keep those gains. In other instances, 
the law may order defendants to do (or stop doing) something un-
lawful or harmful. 
Each of these goals of remedies law, however, runs into diffi-
culties when the bad actor in question is neither a person nor a 
corporation but a robot. We might order a robot—or, more realis-
tically, the designer or owner of the robot—to pay for the damages 
it causes. (Though, as we will see, even that presents some sur-
prisingly thorny problems.) But it turns out to be much harder for 
a judge to “order” a robot, rather than a human, to engage in or 
refrain from certain conduct. Robots can’t directly obey court or-
ders not written in computer code. And bridging the translation 
gap between natural language and code is often harder than we 
might expect. This is particularly true of modern AI techniques 
that empower machines to learn and modify their decision- 
 
 2 See generally Solon Barocas and Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 
104 Cal L Rev 671 (2016); Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 Cal L Rev Cir 45 
(2015); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 Cal L Rev 513 (2015); Harry 
Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 Wash L Rev 87 (2014); Kate Darling, Extending 
Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent 
Behavior towards Robotic Objects in Robot Law, in Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin, and 
Ian Kerr, eds, Robot Law 213 (Edward Elgar 2016); Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, Big 
Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 BC 
L Rev 93 (2014); Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the 
Future of Patent Law, 57 BC L Rev 1079 (2016); Bryan Casey, Amoral Machines, or: How 
Roboticists Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Law, 111 Nw U L Rev 1347 (2017). 
2019] Remedies for Robots 1315 
 
making over time,3 as the drone in the opening example did. If we 
don’t know how the robot “thinks,” we won’t know how to tell it to 
behave in a way likely to cause it to do what we actually want it 
to do. 
One way to avoid these problems may be to move responsibil-
ity up the chain of command from a robot to its human or corpo-
rate masters—either the designers of the system or the owners 
who deploy it. But that too is easier said than done. Robot  
decision-making is increasingly likely to be based on algorithms 
of staggering complexity and obscurity. The developers—and cer-
tainly the users—of those algorithms won’t necessarily be able to 
deterministically control the outputs of their robots. To compli-
cate matters further, some systems—including many self-driving 
cars—distribute responsibility for their robots between both de-
signers and downstream operators. For systems of this kind, it 
has already proven extremely difficult to allocate responsibility 
when accidents inevitably occur.4 
Moreover, if the ultimate goal of a legal remedy is to encour-
age good behavior or discourage bad behavior, punishing owners 
or designers for the behavior of their robots may not always make 
sense—if only for the simple reason that their owners didn’t act 
tortiously. The same problem affects injunctive relief. Courts are 
used to ordering people and companies to do (or stop doing) cer-
tain things, with a penalty of contempt of court for non- 
compliance. But ordering a robot to abstain from certain behavior 
won’t be trivial in many cases. And ordering it to take affirmative 
acts may prove even more problematic. 
In this Article, we begin to think about how we might design 
a system of remedies for robots. It may, for example, make sense 
to focus less of our doctrinal attention on moral guilt and more of 
it on no-fault liability systems (or at least ones that define fault 
differently) to compensate plaintiffs. But addressing payments 
for injury solves only part of the problem. Often, we want to com-
pel defendants to do (or not do) something in order to prevent in-
jury. Injunctions, punitive damages, and even remedies like dis-
gorgement are all aimed—directly or indirectly—at modifying or 
deterring behavior. But deterring robot misbehavior is going to 
look very different than deterring humans. Our existing doctrines 
 
 3 See Part II.E. 
 4 See notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
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often take advantage of “irrational” human behavior like cogni-
tive biases and risk aversion. Courts, for instance, can rely on the 
fact that most of us don’t want to go to jail, so we tend to avoid 
conduct that might lead to that result. But robots will be deterred 
only to the extent that their algorithms are modified to include 
sanctions as part of the risk-reward calculus. These limitations 
may even require us to institute a “robot death penalty” as a sort 
of specific deterrence against certain bad behaviors. Today, spec-
ulation of this sort may sound far-fetched. But the field already 
includes examples of misbehaving robots being taken offline per-
manently5—a trend which only appears likely to increase in the 
years ahead. 
Finally, remedies law also has an expressive component that 
will be complicated by robots. We sometimes grant punitive dam-
ages—or disgorge ill-gotten gains—to show our displeasure with 
you. If our goal is just to feel better about ourselves, perhaps we 
might also punish robots simply for the sake of punishing them. 
Professor Christina Mulligan half-jokingly suggests that we 
should have the right to punch a robot.6 But if our goal is to send 
a slightly more nuanced signal than that through the threat of 
punishment, robots will require us to rethink many of our current 
doctrines. 
In Part I, we discuss the development of robots and learning 
AIs, as well as the sorts of robot wrongdoing that will increasingly 
draw the attention of the legal system. In Part II, we outline the 
basic principles of remedies law and consider how those remedies 
will work—or not work—when applied to robots and AIs. Finally, 
in Part III, we consider how we might remake remedies law with 
robots in mind. 
I.  BAD ROBOTS 
A. Rise of the Machines 
“Robots again.” When Judge Alex Kozinski opened his dissent 
from denial of rehearing en banc in Wendt v Host International7 
with this line, he could count on it fetching an ironic grin because 
 
 5 See Part III.D. 
 6 Christina Mulligan, Revenge against Robots, 69 SC L Rev 579, 588–89 (2018) (“If 
it turns out that punishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to hu-
mans following an injury, we should punish robots.”). 
 7 197 F3d 1284 (9th Cir 1999). 
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it was, well, ironic.8 Wendt prominently featured an animatronic 
version of two television personas,9 much like another case the 
jurist had overseen some three years prior.10 And in the late 
1990s, suits of this sci-fi-esque variety represented such a novelty 
that the judge’s reference was unmissable. Robots again? Sure. 
But only because two cases in three years involving robots felt, at 
the time, like a freak recurrence. 
Fast forward just two decades to the present, and Judge 
Kozinski’s quip appears quaint by comparison. Nowadays, robots 
are ubiquitous. Industries as far flung as finance, transportation, 
defense, and healthcare regularly invest billions in the technol-
ogy. Patent filings for robotics and AI applications have surged.11 
Even octogenarian senators can be heard fumbling over phrases 
once confined exclusively to computer science departments, such 
as “botnet,” “machine learning algorithm,” and “deep neural net-
work.”12 Robots again, indeed. 
Comparing these two moments—separated by just twenty 
years—puts on full display the field’s breathtaking progress. To-
day, technological feats that read like pages torn from sci-fi novels 
have become regular fixtures of the news. Robots have driven mil-
lions of miles on US roadways,13 humbled human professionals at 
the pinnacle of their fields,14 and even performed high-stakes sur-
gical procedures on cardiac patients.15 And as innovators continue 
to compete against each other in increasingly diverse domains, 
 
 8 Id at 1285 (Kozinski dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc). The 
zeitgeist captured by Judge Kozinski’s opening line was first noted by Ryan Calo, Robots 
in American Law *2 (University of Washington School of Law Research Paper No 2016-
04, Feb 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3YD6-XNQV. 
 9 Wendt v Host International, Inc, 125 F3d 806, 809 (9th Cir 1997). 
 10 The case referred to here is White v Samsung Electronics America, Inc, 971 F2d 
1395, 1396–97 (9th Cir 1992), which involved an animatronic version of Vanna White, a 
television game show persona. 
 11 See Calo, Robots in American Law at *3 (cited in note 8), citing World Intellectual 
Property Organization, World Intellectual Property Report: Breakthrough Innovation and 
Economic Growth *120–35 (2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FC4D-CX6W (noting surge 
in IP activity for robots). 
 12 Consider, for example, Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing (Wash 
Post, Apr 10, 2018), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/ 
2018/04/10/transcript-of-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing (visited Apr 16, 2019) (Perma 
archive unavailable). 
 13 See, for example, Waymo, Waymo Safety Report: On the Road to Fully Self-Driving 
*3 (2018), archived at http://perma.cc/LQ64-UJT9. 
 14 See notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 15 See, for example, Robotic Surgery Center, What is Robotic Surgery? (NYU Langone 
Health), archived at http://perma.cc/88QA-RQRQ. 
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“robots” themselves are taking on new and expansive forms.16 
Gone are the days of robots confined to assembly lines or ware-
house floors.17 With each passing week, robots infiltrate deeper 
into our public spaces, places of work, and even bedrooms.18 
The disruptive forces unleashed by this ascendant technology 
are challenging long-held assumptions about the limits of ma-
chine capabilities—forcing the rest of society to adapt not only 
economically and politically, but also legally. In the last few years 
alone, autonomous19 robots have killed and maimed others, acci-
dentally20 or intentionally;21 helped determine who goes to prison 
and who stays there;22 spouted racist and homophobic remarks on 
our social media platforms;23 and even shaped the course of our 
national elections.24 Far from anomalous, all signs suggest that 
these types of events are destined to become the new normal as 
robots continue their march into the social mainstream in the  
decades ahead. 
 
 16 See Gill A. Pratt, Is a Cambrian Explosion Coming for Robotics?, 29 J Econ Persp 
51, 51 (2015) (“Today, technological developments on several fronts are fomenting . . . [an] 
explosion in the diversification and applicability of robotics.”). 
 17 And not just because they sometimes escape. See Complaint and Jury Demand, 
Holbrook v Prodomax Automation, Ltd, No 1:17-cv-00219, *3 (WD Mich filed Mar 7, 2017) 
(Holbrook Complaint) (wrongful death suit alleging a robot escaped from its work area at 
a Michigan auto parts factory and killed a woman). 
 18 See notes 66–72 and accompanying text. 
 19 Or, as Jonathan Zittrain might describe, “autonomish” robots. See Jonathan L. 
Zittrain, What Yesterday’s Copyright Wars Teach Us about Today’s Issues in AI, delivered 
as the David L. Lange Lecture in Intellectual Property Law at Harvard Law School (2018), 
transcript archived at http://perma.cc/TZP7-H4EH. 
 20 See, for example, Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian 
in Arizona, Where Robots Roam (NY Times, Mar 19, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/N88D-SBX9; Holbrook Complaint at *3 (cited in note 17). 
 21 See, for example, Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous 
Weapons, 164 U Pa L Rev 1347, 1389–1402 (2016) (discussing robotic weapons systems 
and their potential legal liability). 
 22 See, for example, Sam Corbett-Davies, Sharad Goel, and Sandra González-Bailón, 
Even Imperfect Algorithms Can Improve the Criminal Justice System (NY Times, Dec 20, 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/Z55B-DK22. 
 23 See, for example, James Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot to Be a 
Racist Asshole in Less Than a Day (The Verge, Mar 24, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8B3G-LWEC. 
 24 See, for example, Charles Duhigg, The Case against Google (NY Times, Feb 20, 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/64Y7-3NAU (noting that prominent lawmakers and 
critics “have accused Google of creating an automated advertising system so vast and  
subtle that hardly anyone noticed when Russian saboteurs co-opted it in the last election”). 
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In the view of many leading experts, the challenges posed by 
this impending “robot revolution”25 could precipitate a jurispru-
dential revolution of similar magnitude.26 And though numerous 
scholars have begun to explore the ramifications robots pose for 
our substantive legal rules, comparatively little attention has 
been paid to the rules governing remedies.27 Our goal is to change 
that. But in order to understand the impact that robots may have 
on this area of law, it is helpful to first review the technology’s 
defining characteristics, as well as the ways legal issues will most 
likely arise. 
B.  Defining “Robot” 
Though “robot” has appeared in common parlance for nearly 
a century,28 the term is still notoriously resistant to definition.29 
For many outside of computer science circles, it continues to evoke 
1950s-era stock images of ironclad humanoids adorned with 
flashing lights, accompanied by the obligatory monotone voice. 
More recently, though, “robot” and its derivative “robotics” have 
come to take on more exacting definitions within broader expert 
communities. 
Among legal scholars, efforts have been made to define robots 
by their so-called “essential qualities.”30 Such qualities refer to the 
fundamental, legally pertinent “characteristics that distinguish 
[robots] from prior or constituent technology such as computers 
or phones.”31 One leading scholar, Professor Ryan Calo, argues 
that robots exhibit at least three “essential qualities”: namely, 
 
 25 See Andrew Berg, Edward F. Buffie, and Luis-Felipe Zanna, Should We Fear the 
Robot Revolution? (The Correct Answer Is Yes) *4 (International Monetary Fund Working 
Paper No 18-116, May 21, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/TBM9-RSLC (arguing that 
global society is on the cusp of a second industrial revolution thanks to advances in  
robotics and artificial intelligence). 
 26 See note 143. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See Oliver Morton, Immigrants from the Future (The Economist, May 27, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y59U-WB2Y (noting Karl Capek’s coinage of the term in his 
1920s play titled R.U.R.: Rossumovi Univerzální Roboti). 
 29 Indeed, the problem may be intractable, as we argue elsewhere. See Bryan Casey 
and Mark A. Lemley, You Might Be a Robot, 105 Cornell L Rev *18–28 (forthcoming 2019), 
archived at http://perma.cc/L3B6-7Y6A. 
 30 See Calo, 103 Cal L Rev at 529–32 (cited in note 2). 
 31 See id at 514 (discussing the “essential qualities” of the Internet and the  
emergence of “cyberlaw” in the mid-1990s). 
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“embodiment,”32 “emergence,”33 and “social valence.”34 In Calo’s 
telling: 
Robotics combines, arguably for the first time, the  
promiscuity of information with the [embodied] capacity 
to do physical harm. Robots display increasingly emer-
gent behavior, permitting the technology to accomplish 
both useful and unfortunate tasks in unexpected ways. 
And robots, more so than any technology in history, feel 
to us like social actors—a tendency so strong that sol-
diers sometimes jeopardize themselves to preserve the 
“lives” of military robots in the field.35 
In light of these qualities, Calo argues that “robots are best 
thought of as artificial objects or systems that sense, process, and 
act upon the world to at least some degree.”36 Thus, “[a] robot in 
the strongest, fullest sense of the term exists in the world as a 
corporeal object with the capacity to exert itself physically.”37 
As innovation in robotics continues to advance apace, how-
ever, the sharp dividing lines of even these recently established 
“essential qualities” are rapidly blurring. Nowadays, disembodied 
systems that exist purely as bits and bytes regularly go by the 
monikers of “bot,” “chatbot,” “crawlerbot,” “spambot,” “socialbot,” 
and so forth. When systems of these types operate in parallel, the 
collective is often referred to by the ominous title of “botnet.” And 
when gaming or strategy robots run metaphorical circles around 
human champions in the likes of Go38 or DotA,39 they do so in en-
tirely ethereal forms with the capacity to exert themselves only 
digitally. 
 
 32 Id at 534 (describing “embodiment” as the “capacity to act physically upon the 
world [and], in turn, to the potential to physically harm people or property”). 
 33 Id at 538 (describing “emergence” as the ability to “do more than merely repeat 
instructions but adapt to circumstance”). 
 34 Calo, 103 Cal L Rev at 545–49 (cited in note 2) (describing “social valence” as the 
heightened emotional response triggered in humans by our tendency to anthropomorphize 
robots). 
 35 Id at 515. 
 36 Id at 531. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Cade Metz, In a Huge Breakthrough, Google’s AI Beats a Top Player at the Game 
of Go (Wired, Jan 27, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/KB42-9TGC. “Go” is an ancient 
strategy game that is comparable to chess, though far more computationally complex. Id. 
 39 Tom Simonite, Can Bots Outwit Humans in One of the Biggest Esports Games? 
(Wired, June 25, 2018), online at http://www.wired.com/story/can-bots-outwit-humans-in-
one-of-the-biggest-esports-games (visited Apr 24, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). DotA 
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Thus, unlike some technologies that have become routinized 
as their commercial and social presence has increased, robots ap-
pear to have done the opposite. As Professor Jack Balkin recently 
observed, a similar phenomenon occurred in the cell phone indus-
try.40 According to the scholar, “Thirty years ago people might 
have argued that an essential characteristic of a cell phone was 
its ability to make a phone call outside of one’s home. But this 
feature of cell phones is by no means the primary way that people 
use them today.”41 So, too, it seems is true of the “essential quali-
ties” of yesteryears’ robots. Already, those that Calo enumerated 
less than five years ago read like relics of a bygone era—a testa-
ment to the field’s engine of innovation firing on all cylinders.42 
Today, the terms “robotics” and “artificial intelligence” are of-
ten used interchangeably, referring to both embodied and disem-
bodied systems that affect the physical and digital worlds alike. 
And while there are important technical distinctions to be made 
between the two concepts, we adopt the convention of construing 
“robot” to encompass both robots in Calo’s “essentialist” sense and 
artificially intelligent systems embodied only in software. Our 
goal is to include any hardware or software system exhibiting  
intelligent behavior.43 
 
is one of the internet’s most popular real-time strategy games and is more difficult for AI 
systems than Go or chess. Id. 
 40 See Balkin, 6 Cal L Rev Cir at 47 (2015) (cited in note 2). 
 41 Id. 
 42 See notes 66–69 and accompanying text. See also, for example, Balkin, 6 Cal L Rev 
Cir at 45 (cited in note 2) (stating he does “not think it is helpful to speak in terms of 
‘essential qualities’ of a new technology that we can then apply to law”). 
 43 Our broad reading of “robot” also extends to regression-based predictive systems 
such as the headline-grabbing “COMPAS” tool for predicting criminal behavior. See Julia 
Angwin, et al, Machine Bias (ProPublica, May 23, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GE6Q-7GQY (detailing COMPAS’s role as a criminal risk assessment 
tool). We include these systems—which could also be described as mere statistical tools—
in our definition of “robot” with some hesitation. But the fact remains that such systems 
are now routinely anthropomorphized by academics and media outlets alike as “AI.” See, 
for example, Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 Mich L Rev 1023, 1025 (2017) 
(“[O]ur prescription to the problem of racist or sexist algorithms is algorithmic affirmative 
action.”) (citations omitted); Christian Sandvig, et al, When the Algorithm Itself Is a Racist: 
Diagnosing Ethical Harm in the Basic Components of Software, 10 Intl J Communication 
4972, 4975 (2016) (“Since these [algorithms] require an explicit definition of skin and non-
skin colors in advance, it logically follows they could certainly be racist.”); James Zou and 
Londa Schiebinger, Design AI So That It’s Fair, 559 Nature 324, 324 (2018). We believe 
including them in our discussion of robots is appropriate. As we note elsewhere, however, 
this is one example of the definitional problems that beset the field. See Casey and Lemley, 
105 Cornell L Rev at *18–28 (cited in note 29). 
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1. What makes robots smart? 
But what, then, does it mean for a robot to be “intelligent”? 
Experts operating at the cutting edge of the field describe “artifi-
cial intelligence”—in somewhat circular fashion—as the “science 
of making machines smart.”44 And though the definition may be 
wanting for precision, it is this singular feature—the ability to 
execute complex behaviors such as planning, language pro-
cessing, or object recognition—that differentiates a robot from a 
barren hunk of metal, plastic, or bits.45 
Robots exhibit their “smarts” by executing “algorithms.”46 
Although the term has a certain cerebral ring to it, it actually de-
scribes a simple concept. Algorithms are merely sequences of in-
structions for performing a given task.47 When translated into 
software, these instructions can be simplified further still. In fact, 
all commands given to a computational system are reducible to 
one of three logical operators: AND, OR, and NOT.48 If chained 
together in the right way, these basic operators can produce be-
haviors of breathtaking complexity. Yet at bottom, even the most 
sophisticated algorithms are composed of simple, logic-based 
building blocks. 
For much of AI’s history as a scientific field, the prevailing 
paradigm of system design involved explicitly encoding the algo-
rithms that governed robots.49 This approach—sometimes termed 
the “classic,” “symbolic,” or “GOFAI” approach (short for “Good 
Old-Fashioned A.I.”)—required that scientists or engineers hand-
code robot behaviors through “explicit, logical representation of 
 
 44 See Kamal Ahmed, Google’s Demis Hassabis—Misuse of Artificial Intelligence 
“Could Do Harm’’ (BBC News, Sept 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7PNC-XXAB. 
While some scholars have suggested that “there is a continuum between ‘robots’ and ‘arti-
ficial intelligence,’” Balkin, 6 Cal L Rev Cir at 50 (cited in note 2), the distinction is actu-
ally artificial (if you’ll pardon the expression). Without the ability to exhibit intelligent 
behavior, any so-called robot would be little more than an inanimate composite of metal, 
plastic, or bits. Accordingly, AI is better understood as a component feature of any robotics 
system, rather than an entity separate from it. 
 45 That doesn’t mean we think this definition of a robot will suffice. To the contrary, 
we suggest elsewhere that it is as flawed as other definitions. See Casey and Lemley, 105 
Cornell L Rev at *18–28 (cited in note 29). 
 46 See Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learn-
ing Machine Will Remake Our World 1–22 (Basic Books 2015). 
 47 Id at 1. 
 48 Id at 1–2. 
 49 See id at 6–8. 
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facts about the world.”50 The expression “dogs have four legs,” for 
example, might be represented as:51 
 ∀x (is_a_dog(x) ⇒ number_of_legs(x) = 4) 
 
In plain English, this statement translates to: “For every entity, 
if that entity is a dog, it has four legs.” 
The precision and austerity of the GOFAI approach has obvi-
ous appeal. Among other features, explicitly encoded algorithms 
are inherently predictable and explainable. And robots pro-
grammed using this approach are still capable of exhibiting 
astonishingly complex behaviors, ranging from mathematical cal-
culations far surpassing human capabilities, to conquering world 
chess champions.52 
But GOFAI also has its limits. How, for example, is an AI 
system embedded with a four-legged representation of dogs sup-
posed to categorize the small fraction that do not have four legs, 
either through accident or genetics? Without prospectively ac-
counting for these types of outliers, hand-coded machines have no 
means of learning such distinctions on the fly.53 
Take, for example, the task of navigation. Classically encoded 
robots have long excelled at getting from point A to point B in 
warehouses or factories—whether traversing a floor on four 
wheels or a three-dimensional space with an articulated arm.54 
This aptitude has owed to the fact that warehouses and factories 
are, by and large, tightly controlled environments. As such, “pro-
grammers could anticipate the range of scenarios a [robot] may 
encounter, and could program if-then-else-type decision algo-
rithms accordingly.”55 
 
 50 See David Auerbach, The Programs That Become the Programmers (Slate, Sept 
25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/72AJ-Y9YN. 
 51 This example derives from David Auerbach’s piece. See id. 
 52 The latter example refers to IBM Deep Blue’s defeat of the world chess champion, 
Garry Kasparov, in 1997, which was accomplished using a brute-force GOFAI approach. See 
Matt McFarland, Google Just Mastered a Game That Vexed Scientists—and Their Machines—
for Decades (Wash Post, Jan 27, 2016), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-
novations/wp/2016/01/27/google-just-mastered-a-game-thats-vexed-scientists-for-decades  
(visited Apr 16, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 53 In many instances, programmers can teach their robots how to handle these types 
of “edge cases” by prospectively encoding fail-safe measures that anticipate them. But even 
robust GOFAI approaches that account for a wide array of edge cases are often no match 
for amorphous and ambiguous real-world environments. 
 54 Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb, The Simple Economics of Machine In-
telligence (Harvard Business Review, Nov 17, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/V9VW-ZDSF. 
 55 See id. 
1324 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1311 
 
On a smooth, clearly demarcated surface with little chance of 
encountering obstacles (much less inclement weather) the num-
ber of uncertainties and edge cases presented was reduced to 
manageable proportions. But translating a similar navigation 
task to a bustling city street has been another matter entirely. 
Because the number of uncertainties a robot might encounter in 
most uncontrolled environments approaches infinity, navigating 
using a GOFAI approach requires a commensurate number of a 
priori if-then-else statements. Hand-coded algorithms, in other 
words, simply do not scale. For decades, this inherent limitation 
of GOFAI—what Professor Pedro Domingos terms the 
“knowledge acquisition bottleneck”56—hindered significant pro-
gress in the field, leading to a painful period of stagnation that 
came to be known as the “AI Winter.”57 Thanks to recent break-
throughs in an innovative approach known as “machine learn-
ing,” however, the AI Winter is emphatically over.58 
2. How do machines learn? 
Machine learning turns the GOFAI approach to algorithmic 
design on its head. Rather than laying out a specific set of instruc-
tions for the robot follow, engineers instead specify a goal or set 
of goals for the robot to achieve when tackling a given problem, 
often referred to as an “optimizing function.” Having established 
the desired goal, the robot is then left to author its own algorithms 
for achieving it, which it does by practicing on illustrative exam-
ples of the problem at hand. 
At the outset, the robot usually just flails around in the 
dark—trying things essentially at random without a good idea of 
what will or won’t work.59 But each time its experimental efforts 
 
 56 Domingos, The Master Algorithm at 89–90 (cited in note 46). 
 57 See id. 
 58 See Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology 289 
(Viking 2005) (writing “the AI winter is long since over”). 
 59 Robots, of course, receive a considerable amount of help throughout this process. 
Like children with parents hovering over them, most machines require that designers first 
label, categorize, or “featurize” input data before the machines begin guessing. See Andrew 
D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 Ga L Rev 109, 131–35 (2017); David 
Lehr and Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn about 
Machine Learning, 51 UC Davis L Rev 653, 672–77 (2017) (offering a detailed description 
of the various parts of machine learning). The subset of machine learning known as “un-
supervised” or “semi-supervised” learning attempts to minimize human intervention in 
this regard. 
2019] Remedies for Robots 1325 
 
move it closer to the goal specified by its designers, the robot re-
ceives positive feedback and uses statistical techniques to im-
prove its algorithms accordingly.60 Thus, instead of repeatedly ex-
ecuting an unchanging set of instructions, machine learning 
approaches enable robots to iteratively write their own instruc-
tions as they go.61 And if given enough examples to train on, these 
systems can prove remarkably adept at solving staggeringly com-
plex tasks that admit of no obvious GOFAI solutions. 
Therein lies the promise of machine learning. When the end-
less fine-tuning of algorithmic instructions would be impossible 
to do by hand, machines themselves are able to successfully nav-
igate the knowledge acquisition bottleneck.62 The program, thus, 
becomes the programmer—obviating the need for engineers to  
anticipate a near-infinite number of edge cases. 
When embedded in a broader software or hardware applica-
tion, the possibilities created by this powerful approach are seem-
ingly endless. Indeed, many leading experts now view machine 
learning as one among a rarified number of “general-purpose 
technologies” (GPTs), the likes of which include the modern en-
gine, the Internet, and electricity.63 Such technologies are distin-
guished by their ability to “significantly enhance productivity or 
quality across a wide number of fields or sectors.”64 Scholars have 
recognized three criteria of GPTs that machine learning appears 
to possess in abundance: “[T]hey have pervasive application 
across many sectors; they spawn further innovation in application 
sectors, and they themselves are rapidly improving.”65 
Today, companies as diverse as Walmart, Facebook, and Gen-
eral Motors are adopting machine learning systems at “unprece-
dented rates due to the technology’s ability to radically improve 
data-driven decision-making at a cost and scale incomparable to 
 
 60 And when it performs poorly, vice versa. 
 61 See Domingos, The Master Algorithm at 6 (cited in note 46). 
 62 See id at 89–90. 
 63 Corbin Barthold, Artificial Intelligence Will Benefit Us Immensely—If We Don’t 
Get in the Way (Forbes, Dec 4, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/8CPE-X5BE. 
 64 Iain M. Cockburn, Rebecca Henderson, and Scott Stern, The Impact of Artificial 
Intelligence on Innovation: An Exploratory Analysis *5, NBER Conference on Research 
Issues in Artificial Intelligence (unpublished manuscript, Dec 16, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/D53V-C3RD. 
 65 Id. See generally Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical 
Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox, 80 Am Econ Rev 355 (1990). 
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that of humans.”66 It is this engineering approach that allows au-
tonomous vehicles, self-flying drones, and warehouse “fetching” 
robots67 to function with seeming ease in unimaginably complex 
environments. And beyond these robots of the more “essentialist” 
variety, machine learning also powers a vast array of entities 
classified as “cyber-physical systems” (for example, Internet of 
Things devices), as well as disembodied digital systems often clas-
sified as software bots.68 
C. When Robots Do Harm 
Machine learning is not without its limitations, however. By 
breaking from the GOFAI paradigm, robots powered by this tech-
nique must also embrace a higher degree of uncertainty than 
their classically encoded counterparts. Because machines share 
in the task of writing their algorithms, using machine learning 
requires sacrificing some degree of fine-grained control over a ma-
chine’s algorithms. Accordingly, designers seeking to implement 
this powerful approach also understand that it can produce robots 
that are difficult to predict, tricky to debug, and hard or even im-
possible to understand.69 
For many years, this engineering reality limited the most 
successful machine learning applications to domains with high 
degrees of fault tolerance. After all, it is one thing for a song rec-
ommendation engine to miss its mark 20 percent of the time. But 
it is quite another for an autonomous vehicle’s Light Detection 
and Ranging (LIDAR) system to miss oncoming vehicles at a  
similar clip. 
In the last decade, however, advances in the field have ena-
bled engineers to dramatically improve the accuracy, predictabil-
ity, and performance of numerous machine learning applica-
tions—thus enabling them to entrust robots with positions of 
greater decision-making authority than ever before. It is these  
 
 66 Bryan Casey, Ashkon Farhangi, and Roland Vogl, Rethinking Explainable Ma-
chines: The GDPR’s “Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in 
Enterprise, 34 Berkeley Tech L J 143, 149 (2019). 
 67 See Mick Mountz, Kiva the Disrupter (Harvard Business Review, Dec 2012),  
archived at http://perma.cc/6FSY-ZY35. 
 68 See Rebecca Crootof, The Internet of Torts, 69 Duke L J *3–10 (forthcoming 2019), 
archived at http://perma.cc/8TGY-J9QC. 
 69 See Domingos, The Master Algorithm at 258–59 (cited in note 46). 
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advances that have allowed for the introduction of high-stakes ro-
botics systems including self-driving cars,70 medical diagnostic ro-
bots,71 and even experimental autonomous passenger drones.72 
Yet, even the most performant of these systems remains imper-
fect—much like the human decision-makers they seek to emulate. 
Accepting imperfection also means accepting the possibility 
that robotics systems will sometimes cause harm to others. In-
deed, robots acting in harmful, occasionally catastrophic, ways 
are already a regular fixture of modern life.73 The following sec-
tions survey some of the harms complex robotics systems are like-
liest to cause, providing contemporary examples of each. 
1. Unavoidable harms. 
Many robots operating free from software bugs, hardware  
errors, or failures of engineering precaution will nevertheless 
harm others. Some dangers, after all, are inherent to a product or 
service. In such instances, calling for the total elimination of the 
danger is tantamount to calling for a prohibition on a product or 
service itself. 
 
 70 See, for example, Alexis C. Madrigal, The Most Important Self-Driving Car  
Announcement Yet (The Atlantic, Mar 28, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/D8K5-YD8U 
(reporting that autonomous driving will be implemented “at scale” within “two years or 
less” and “that [Waymo’s] fleet [of 20,000 cars] alone will be capable of doing a million 
trips each day in 2020”); Heather Somerville, Uber, Transitioning to Fleet Operator, Or-
ders 24,000 Driverless Cars from Volvo (Insurance Journal, Nov 21, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/YY5E-NQMJ. 
 71 See, for example, Emily Mullin, FDA Approves AI-Powered Diagnostic That 
Doesn’t Need a Doctor’s Help (MIT Technology Review, Apr 11, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6QZ2-VPCW. 
 72 See, for example, Bernard Marr, 6 Amazing Passenger Drone Projects Everyone 
Should Know About (Forbes, Mar 26, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/A7X7-STWU. 
 73 Robotic cars, aircraft, and manufacturing systems have killed and maimed third 
parties. See, for example, Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian (cited in 
note 20); Peter Holley, After Crash, Injured Motorcyclist Accuses Robot-Driven Vehicle of “Neg-
ligent Driving” (Wash Post, Jan 25, 2018), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/    
innovations/wp/2018/01/25/after-crash-injured-motorcyclist-accuses-robot-driven-vehicle-
of-negligent-driving (visited Apr 16, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable); Julie A. Stein-
berg, “Killer Robot” Suit Awaits Ruling on Japanese Maker (Bloomberg Environment, May 
24, 2018), online at http://news.bloombergenvironment.com/safety/killer-robot-suit-
awaits-ruling-on-japanese-maker (visited Apr 16, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). Ro-
bots tasked with making online purchases have been “arrested” for illicitly buying narcot-
ics on the dark web. See Arjun Kharpal, Robot with $100 Bitcoin Buys Drugs, Gets Arrested 
(CNBC, Apr 21, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JZ5W-KFVZ. And robots powering our 
largest social media platforms have even influenced the course of national elections. See 
Duhigg, The Case against Google (cited in note 24). 
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Harms of this variety are often referred to as “unavoidable 
harms.”74 Conceptually, the notion of such harms tends to evoke 
products such as cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, or knives. 
But as Professor Robert Peterson notes, virtually no product or 
service is perfectly “safe,” whether it is a jar of peanuts75 or a tea 
cozy—much less a complex robotics application.76 Robots have in-
jured people by breaking things in warehouses.77 But so, of course, 
have people. 
An illustrative example of the types of unavoidable harms 
that robots will cause can be found in the autonomous vehicle con-
text. Ever since the transition from the horse-drawn buggy to the 
modern automobile, vehicular transportation has entailed error-
prone humans, strapped to hulking masses of steel, navigating 
highly complex environments at highly dangerous speeds. Ac-
cordingly, “For more than a century, safety professionals have be-
gun with the assumption that cars would crash, and focused their 
efforts on reducing the damage.”78 Experts too numerous to list 
have convincingly argued that this same assumption will also 
hold for cars driven by robots as opposed to humans.79 For even 
 
 74 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520. See generally Joseph A. Page, Liability 
for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does Negligence Doctrine Have a 
Role to Play?, 72 Chi Kent L Rev 87 (1996); James A. Henderson Jr and Aaron D. Twerski, 
Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability without Defect, 
66 NYU L Rev 1263 (1991); Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates 
Should Be Kept Closed, 36 S Tex L Rev 385 (1995); Frank H. McCarthy, Products Liabil-
ity—Doctrine of Unavoidably Unsafe Products Applied to Manufacturer of Polio Vaccine, 
11 Tulsa L J 296 (1975). 
 75 See Welge v Planters Lifesavers Co, 17 F3d 209, 210 (7th Cir 1994). 
 76 See Robert W. Peterson, New Technology—Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and 
California’s Insurance Framework, 52 Santa Clara L Rev 1341, 1355 (2012) (“However 
safer [robots] may be, they will still be dangerous and will spin off injuries.”). 
 77 See Soo Youn, 24 Amazon Workers Sent to Hospital After Robot Accidentally  
Unleashes Bear Spray (ABC News, Dec 6, 2018), online at http://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
24-amazon-workers-hospital-bear-repellent-accident/story?id=59625712 (visited May 4, 
2019) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 78 Mark R. Rosekind, Remarks: Autonomous Car Detroit Conference (National High-
way Traffic Safety Administration, Mar 16, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6DLL-
NC6T. See also, for example, Jensen v American Suzuki Motor Corp, 35 P3d 776, 779 
(Idaho 2001) (noting that underlying the doctrine of “crashworthiness” is the assumption 
that not all accidents are avoidable); Skeie v Mercer Trucking Co, Inc, 61 P3d 1207, 1210 
(Wash App 2003) (“[C]ourts recognize that it is reasonably foreseeable, even statistically 
inevitable, that vehicles will be involved in collisions.”). 
 79 Today’s human-driven car accidents can cause unavoidable injuries to drivers, 
passengers, bystanders, and property. But there is an important difference between con-
temporary cars and the robocars of the future. Injury from a car crash today is typically 
the result either of the design of the car or, far more commonly, the behavior of the hu-
mans. The law distinguishes those two types of harm, holding manufacturers responsible 
for injuries caused by product design and human drivers responsible for the injuries they 
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superhumanly safe self-driving systems are subject to the laws of 
physics. And if autonomous vehicles driven by such systems un-
expectedly encounter an individual or object without sufficient 
time or distance to prevent a collision, harm of some variety may 
be unavoidable.80 
2. Deliberate least-cost harms. 
A close relative of the “unavoidable harms” detailed above in-
volves “deliberate least-cost harms.” These harms are similar to 
unavoidable ones insofar as they are foreseeable by designers 
and, in some sense, cannot be avoided. But unlike their entirely 
unavoidable counterparts, deliberate least-cost harms fall into a 
grey area where there is sufficient forewarning to meaningfully 
react to an impending harmful event, but no way to avoid the 
harm entirely. The question, thus, becomes one of triage: Which 
of the harmful outcomes is the least costly?81 
This type of lesser-of-evils dilemma, in which injury is both 
inevitable and variable, was canonized by the philosopher Judith 
Thomson in a thought experiment known as the “trolley prob-
lem.”82 In its most popular formulation, the trolley problem pro-
ceeds as follows: 
[A]n observer [ ] is witness to a runaway trolley car  
barreling toward five unwitting workers on the tracks 
ahead. The observer, however, is standing at a switch. If 
pulled, it will divert the trolley onto another track where 
only one unlucky worker awaits. Tragedy of some kind 
is foreordained, but the observer holds the proverbial 
power to steer fate: turn the trolley, killing the one, or 
refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five?83 
 
cause. But self-driving cars, as the name implies, drive themselves. The “design” of the 
product, in other words, is also responsible for its behavior on the road. 
 80 See Noah J. Goodall, Virginia Center for Transportation Innovation and Re-
search, Ethical Decision Making during Automated Vehicle Crashes, 2424 Transportation 
Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 58, 59 (2014) (noting that 
while “any engineering system can fail,” it is important to distinguish that, “for [ ] auto-
mated vehicle[s], even a perfectly-functioning system cannot avoid every collision”). 
 81 Not in strictly monetary terms. 
 82 See Judith Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59 Monist 204, 
206 (1976). Although Thomson coined the term “trolley problem,” the first articulation of 
the thought experiment originated with the philosopher Philippa Foot. See Philippa Foot, 
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 Oxford Rev 5, 8–9 (1967). 
 83 Thomson’s original experiment asked subjects to imagine themselves as the trolley 
driver rather than as an outside observer at a switch. Casey, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1353 
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Ever since the introduction of experimental autonomous  
vehicles to US roadways, scenarios involving killer robocars 
thrust into trolley problem-like dilemmas have captured the pub-
lic and academic imagination.84 But situations of this kind will 
likely be the exception, not the rule, when it comes to deliberate 
least-cost harms.85 Far likelier, albeit subtler, scenarios involving 
least-cost harms will involve robots that make decisions with 
seemingly trivial implications at an individual level, but which 
result in nontrivial impacts at scale.86 
Self-driving cars, for example, will rarely face a stark choice 
between killing a child or killing two elderly people. But thou-
sands of times a day, they will have to choose precisely where to 
change lanes, how closely to trail another vehicle, when to accel-
erate on a freeway on-ramp, and so forth. Each of these decisions 
will entail some probability of injuring someone. And making the 
“right” decision will require weighing the probability of causing 
harm, exploring what alternatives exist, and specifying how the 
car should value the different types of harms that will foreseeably 
 
(quotation marks and citations omitted) (cited in note 2), citing Thomson, 59 Monist at 
206 (cited in note 82). 
 84 See, for example, Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching 
Robots Right from Wrong 16 (Oxford 2009); Joel Achenbach, Driverless Cars Are Colliding 
with the Creepy Trolley Problem (Wash Post, Dec 29, 2015), online at http://www.           
washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/12/29/will-self-driving-cars-ever-solve-
the-famous-and-creepy-trolley-problem (visited Apr 16, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(arguing that “we’re suddenly in a world in which autonomous machines, including self-
driving cars, have to be programmed to deal with Trolley Problem-like emergencies in 
which lives hang in the balance”); John Markoff, Should Your Driverless Car Hit a Pedes-
trian to Save Your Life? (NY Times, June 23, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/7VLC-
5CNE (discussing the “dilemma of robotic morality” and its implications for engineers de-
signing robotic decision-making systems); Matt Simon, To Make Us All Safer, Robocars 
Will Sometimes Have to Kill (Wired, Mar 13, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/K2M3-
GW6Y (“[T]he trolley problem . . . illustrates a strange truth: Not only will robocars fail to 
completely eliminate traffic deaths, but on very, very rare occasions, they’ll be choosing 
who to sacrifice—all to make the roads of tomorrow a far safer place.”). 
 85 One curious approach is to ignore the problem altogether. German law simply for-
bids consideration of the trolley problem in programming autonomous vehicles, saying 
that an autonomous vehicle headed for an accident cannot alter its behavior to prefer one 
life over another. See Dave Gershgorn, Germany’s Self-Driving Car Ethicists: All Lives 
Matter (Quartz, Aug 24, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/U7MX-2KNB; Federal Ministry 
of Transport and Digital Infrastructure, Report by the Ethics Commission on Automated 
and Connected Driving *10 (June 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/YYZ7-N54F. That 
does leave open the question of what the autonomous vehicle should do in an unavoidable 
accident situation, though. “Nothing” may often be the worst response. 
 86 See Casey, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1363 (cited in note 2) (discussing how minute  
differences in how individual vehicles operate could have profoundly consequential  
macroscopic effects). 
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impact different stakeholders. Even seemingly trivial design de-
cisions of this kind will possibly carry a profound ethical and legal 
weight—requiring designers to grapple with complex, highly 
fraught tradeoffs inherent to deliberate least-cost harms, such as 
how much room a self-driving car should give cyclists on one side 
versus cars on the other. 
3. Defect-driven harms. 
One of the more obvious ways robots will cause harm is 
through traditional hardware or software “defects.”87 Harms of 
this variety occur when a software bug, hardware failure, or in-
sufficient level of precaution by designers causes a robot to injure 
others. For much of the field’s history, these types of defect-driven 
harms have been relatively easy to define and identify. They typ-
ically occur when designers intend a robot to work in a certain 
way but make a mistake, causing it to behave differently, as was 
recently alleged in a case involving a robot that “escaped” from its 
section of a trailer hitch assembly plant, “entered [a technician’s] 
work area, surpris[ed] her, and crushed her head between hitch 
assemblies.”88 
As robots continue to take on increasingly sophisticated 
forms, however, defining and identifying these types of “defects” 
will likely become more challenging. Is a self-driving car to be 
deemed “defective” if it brakes more slowly than a human driver? 
What if it brakes faster than humans, but not as fast as other self-
driving cars? Or as fast as other self-driving cars, but not as fast 
as it might possibly brake if reprogrammed? 
Additional legal wrinkles involving defect-driven harms will 
also arise in systems involving a “human-in-the-loop,”89 in which 
responsibility for controlling a robot is distributed between algo-
rithmic and human decision-makers. A boundary-pushing exam-
ple of this phenomenon recently occurred in Tempe, Arizona, 
when a self-driving car deployed by Uber fatally struck a pedes-
trian.90 Although the vehicle was capable of autonomy under cer-
tain design parameters, it also relied on a backup driver to take 
 
 87 This Article does not discuss substantive tort law distinctions found in modern 
tort doctrine. 
 88 Steinberg, “Killer Robot” (cited in note 73). 
 89 See Lorrie Cranor, A Framework for Reasoning about the Human in the Loop *2 
(UPSEC 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/JA53-8AL8. 
 90 See Michael Laris, Tempe Police Release Video of Moments before Autonomous 
Uber Hit Pedestrian (Wash Post, Mar 21, 2018), online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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control in the event of an emergency.91 Yet one night, when a pe-
destrian unexpectedly walked out in front of one such vehicle, nei-
ther the backup driver nor the self-driving system took steps to 
avoid the collision.92 As a result, the vehicle collided with the pe-
destrian at speeds in excess of thirty miles per hour without brak-
ing or swerving.93 Should the backup driver be held responsible 
for failing to take over? Or was it unreasonable for Uber to put 
the operator in such a position to begin with? Does it matter how 
the car was programmed? 
How the legal system will eventually resolve controversies 
involving these types of “moral crumple zones”94 remains an open 
question, even among experts.95 But none question the reality 
that robots exhibiting increasingly complex design defects will 
continue to harm individuals for the foreseeable future. 
4. Misuse harms. 
Sometimes, people will misuse robots in a manner that is nei-
ther negligent nor criminal but nevertheless threatens to harm 
others. Given the unpredictable nature of machine learning sys-
tems, and the nearly infinite variety of ways humans can interact 
with modern robotics applications, these types of harms are par-
ticularly difficult to prevent. Already, media reports are rife with 
examples of individuals attempting to manipulate robot behav-
iors, deceive or “trick” robot perception systems, probe robots for 
safety or security vulnerabilities, or deploy robots in ways that 
adversely impact others.96 Whether such forms of meddling are 
deemed to have been preventable by manufacturers, or to have 
 
news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/03/21/tempe-police-release-video-of-moments-before- 
autonomous-uber-crash (visited Apr 17, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 91 See id. 
 92 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Emergency Braking Was Disabled When Self-Driving Uber 
Killed Woman, Report Says (NY Times, May 24, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/S6PW-
KMBD. 
 93 Id. 
 94 M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction 
*23–25 (We Robot Conference Working Paper, Mar 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LYB8-9PMN. 
 95 Whether these types of questions will ultimately be resolved under the umbrella 
of negligence, breach of warranty, enterprise liability, or traditional product “defect”  
remains unclear. 
 96 See, for example, Ryan Calo, et al, Is Tricking a Robot Hacking? *6–9 (We Robot 
Conference Working Paper, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/4MW7-DR2M; Tom  
Simonite, Microsoft Chatbot Trolls Shoppers for Online Sex (Wired, Aug 7, 2017), archived 
at http://perma.cc/66VS-HYRR; Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too (NY Times, 
Mar 4, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/3336-E8SK. 
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fallen within the scope of the robot’s intended design, will have 
significant implications for the substantive legal doctrines that 
will govern the ultimate outcomes and for who bears the resulting 
liability. 
A now infamous example of robot misuse comes from  
Microsoft’s Twitter chatbot, “Tay.” Unlike chatbots designed to 
maintain a static internal state upon deployment, Tay’s system 
updated itself in real time by learning from interactions with us-
ers.97 Within hours of going live, however, hundreds of Twitter 
users began intentionally tweeting “misogynistic, racist, and  
Donald Trumpist remarks”98 at the robot.99 Thanks to this barrage 
of unforeseen misuse, “Tay rapidly morphed from a fun-loving bot 
. . . into an AI monster.”100 Tay lasted a mere sixteen hours on the 
platform before Microsoft intervened. After initially declining to 
comment, the company eventually noted that a “coordinated ef-
fort by some [Twitter] users to abuse Tay’s commenting skills” led 
it to shut the robot down.101 
One notable feature of the Tay example is that Microsoft it-
self did not engage in misuse. Nor is there any reason to think 
that Tay’s design was defective. Rather, the robot’s rogue conduct 
resulted from the input of third parties.102 But owners, too, will 
misuse robots, or at least use them in ways we may not expect. 
Drone owners, for example, might use them to spy on neighbors 
or invade their privacy.103 Similarly, self-driving car owners might 
 
 97 See Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot to be a Racist Asshole (cited in note 
23); Rachel Metz, Microsoft’s Neo-Nazi Sexbot Was a Great Lesson for Makers of AI Assistants 
(MIT Technology Review, Mar 27, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/D3DH-CLEM. 
 98 Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot to be a Racist Asshole (cited in note 23). 
 99 But we repeat ourselves. 
 100 Metz, Microsoft’s Neo-Nazi Sexbot (cited in note 97). 
 101 Sarah Perez, Microsoft Silences Its New A.I. Bot Tay, after Twitter Users Teach It 
Racism (TechCrunch, Mar 24, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/6ZVQ-CP72. Other chat-
bots have also learned unexpected behavior. China shut down chatbots that began ques-
tioning the authority of the Communist Party. Neil Connor, Rogue Chatbots Deleted in 
China after Questioning Communist Party (The Telegraph, Aug 3, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z4EG-2KWQ. 
 102 One might argue that failing to plan for hijacking by Nazis was a defective design, 
just as a cybersecurity vulnerability might be. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the 
Internet and How to Stop It 149–52 (Yale 2008) (arguing that “strengthen[ing] the Net’s 
experimentalist architecture . . . [and] creat[ing] . . . practices by which relevant people 
and institutions can help secure the Net themselves” will help “blunt[ ] the worst aspects 
of today’s popular generative Internet” without hurting innovation). Courts have been re-
luctant to declare insecure software to be defective, however. For discussion, see Bryan H. 
Choi, Crashworthy Code, 94 Wash L Rev 39, 62–65 (2019). 
 103 For discussion of the various privacy issues that could arise from home robots, see 
generally Margot E. Kaminski, et al, Averting Robot Eyes, 76 Md L Rev 983 (2017). 
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modify their vehicles to protect occupants at all costs, even if do-
ing so imposes greater risks on bystanders. And predictive learn-
ing algorithms that might decide everything from the cost of your 
life insurance to where you end up in an emergency room queue 
to whether you are granted parole are all dependent on the train-
ing data they are fed. And that training is only as good as the 
(often imperfect) data users feed the robot.104 
5. Unforeseen harms. 
Many harms attributable to robots will be neither defect-
driven, unavoidable, nor the result of misuse, but will simply be 
unforeseen by those who designed them.105 Harms of this variety 
are by no means unique to the field of robotics. Indeed, unpredict-
ability is part and parcel of any sufficiently complex system. It’s 
why your computer periodically crashes106 and perhaps why new 
typos seem to pop up in our writing even though we’ve read 
through a draft at least thirty times.107 
But if the last decade of progress in the field of robotics has 
taught us anything, it is that robotics systems using machine 
learning techniques can be extremely hard to predict, rendering 
them particularly susceptible to causing unforeseen harms. This 
phenomenon owes, in large part, to the fact that machine learning 
systems “enter[ ] into a social world already in motion, with an 
existing set of assumptions and expectations about what is likely 
and unlikely, possible and impossible.”108 Yet because such sys-
tems are, by definition, empowered to learn with limited109 direct 
human intervention, the behaviors that they develop can also be 
unconstrained by the norms, assumptions, and expectations that 
implicitly govern humans. 
 
 104 We discuss this problem in more detail in notes 116–25 and accompanying text. 
 105 This could be either because of resource constraints involving safety testing or be-
cause they were genuinely unforeseeable. 
 106 See Clay Shields, Why Do Computers Crash? (Scientific American, Jan 6, 2003), 
archived at http://perma.cc/4WY8-NX2S. 
 107 Okay, maybe not that last one. 
 108 See Balkin, 6 Cal L Rev Cir at 50 (cited in note 2). 
 109 See Domingos, The Master Algorithm at 10 (cited in note 46) (“[M]achine learning 
is the ideal occupation, because learning algorithms do all the work but let you take all 
the credit.”). 
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Sometimes, this lack of constraint can lead to astonishing, 
utterly unintuitive results.110 Robots deployed using machine 
learning techniques, for example, have devised wholly new tactics 
for conquering strategy games,111 have inadvertently set off wars 
of proliferation with bots on online platforms (leading to bizarre 
pricing decisions),112 and have even invented “codewords” to com-
municate with other AI systems that were indecipherable by their 
designers.113 Because of this unpredictability, many complex ro-
bots will carry an enormous range of unforeseeable risks—even 
when numerous precautions are taken in advance of deployment. 
To be clear, the unpredictability inherent in machine learn-
ing is also one of its greatest strengths. An AI that just engages 
in rote calculation of equations we already know the answer to 
might get to the result faster than humans can, but it won’t be 
any better at understanding or predicting outcomes than hu-
mans. We want AIs to do unpredictable things, so long as those 
things lead to good results. We already get many of our greatest 
innovations from the freedom to tinker with the existing world in 
unpredictable ways.114 The same is likely to be true of robots. If 
 
 110 See Balkin, 6 Cal L Rev Cir at 51 (cited in note 2) (“Algorithms can . . . threaten, 
entertain, copy, defame, defraud, warn, console, or seduce. These various effects straddle 
the lines between the physical, the economic, the social, and the emotional.”). 
 111 See, for example, David Silver, et al, Mastering the Game of Go without Human 
Knowledge, 550 Nature 354, 357 (Oct 19, 2017) (noting that the computer program that 
defeated a Go world champion discovered “non-standard strategies beyond the scope of 
traditional Go knowledge”); Nicola Twilley, Artificial Intelligence Goes to the Arcade (New 
Yorker, Feb 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NR4Z-HG4J (writing that “without any 
human coaching,” an AI system designed to play arcade games “not only bec[a]me better 
than any human player but [ ] also discovered a way to win that its creator never  
imagined”). 
 112 See, for example, Taha Yasseri, Never Mind Killer Robots—Even the Good Ones 
Are Scarily Unpredictable (The Conversation, Aug 25, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/A3KW-2SA7 (documenting an inadvertent war of proliferation between 
Wikipedia editing bots); Jessica Leber, Algorithmic Pricing Is Creating an Arms Race on 
Amazon’s Marketplace (Fast Company, June 14, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/N52B-
H7XT; Michael Eisen, Amazon’s $23,698,655.93 Book about Flies (It Is NOT Junk Blog, 
Apr 22, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/8ZNV-4JY5; Samantha Raphelson, “Grinch 
Bots” Attempt to Steal Christmas by Driving Up Toy Prices (NPR, Dec 5, 2017), archived 
at http://perma.cc/5JVD-WKGA. 
 113 See, for example, Tom McKay, No, Facebook Did Not Panic and Shut Down an AI 
Program That Was Getting Dangerously Smart (Gizmodo, July 31, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/44KC-MCE4. 
 114 See, for example, Jeanne Fromer and Mark A. Lemley, Playful Innovation (work-
ing paper 2019) (on file with authors); Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World without Scarcity,  
90 NYU L Rev 460, 485 (2015) (“[T]he Internet carries a surprising lesson for IP theory: 
Despite the prevalence of infringement and the teachings of IP theory, people are creating 
and distributing more content now than ever before, by at least an order of magnitude.”). 
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an AI can reliably conclude that butterfly population variance in 
Tibet affects the weather in Indonesia, it will be better than hu-
mans at predicting the weather. And if a self-driving car can con-
clude from subtle changes in the velocity of the cars surrounding 
it that a crash is imminent, it offers greater hope of avoiding such 
crashes than a human driver might.115 
But the unpredictability of the path that robots will take to 
achieve their goals means that they may do things that make per-
fect sense given what they were asked to maximize, but which 
turn out to reflect either poorly specified goals or flawed training 
data. The Introduction’s example of a drone learning to intention-
ally sabotage its flight path provides just one of the now countless 
documented instances of unforeseen robot behaviors. Another 
comes from the healthcare domain. 
In the 1990s, a pioneering multi-institutional study sought to 
use machine learning techniques to predict health-related risks 
prior to hospitalization.116 After ingesting an enormous quantity 
of data covering patients with pneumonia, the system learned the 
rule: 
 
has_asthma(x) ⇒ lower_risk(x) 
 
The colloquial translation is: “[P]atients with pneumonia who 
have a history of asthma have lower risk of dying from pneumonia 
than the general population.”117 
The machine-derived rule was curious, to say the least. Far 
from being protective, asthma can seriously complicate pulmonary 
 
 115 See, for example, Rob Ludacer, Watch a Tesla Predict an Accident and React Before 
It Even Happens (Business Insider, Dec 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/5N5D-
LM7K (showing a video of Tesla’s Autopilot doing just that). 
 116 See Gregory F. Cooper, et al, An Evaluation of Machine-Learning Methods for Pre-
dicting Pneumonia Mortality, 9 Artificial Intelligence in Medicine 107, 109–11 (1997) (us-
ing data collected from seventy-eight hospitals to predict pneumonia mortality rates using 
a variety of machine learning methods); Richard Ambrosino, et al, The Use of Misclassifi-
cation Costs to Learn Rule-Based Decision Support Models for Cost-Effective Hospital Ad-
mission Strategies in Reed M. Gardner, ed, Proceedings of the Annual Symposium on Com-
puter Applications in Medical Care 304, 305–07 (1995) (using the same data to create an 
algorithm that accounts for asymmetric error costs when determining whether to pre-
scribe inpatient or outpatient therapy for pneumonia patients). 
 117 Rich Caruana, et al, Intelligible Models for HealthCare: Predicting Pneumonia 
Risk and Hospital 30-Day Readmission in Longbing Cao, et al, eds, Proceedings of the 21st 
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 1721, 
1721 (2015). 
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illnesses, including pneumonia. Perplexed by this counterintui-
tive result, the researchers dug deeper. And what they found was 
troubling. 
They discovered that “patients with a history of asthma who 
presented with pneumonia usually were admitted not only to the 
hospital but directly to the ICU (Intensive Care Unit).”118 Once in 
the ICU, asthmatic pneumonia patients went on to receive more 
aggressive care, thereby raising their survival rates compared to 
the general population.119 
The rule, in other words, reflected a genuine pattern in data. 
But the machine had confused correlation with causation—“in-
correctly learn[ing] that asthma lowers risk, when in fact asth-
matics have much higher risk.”120 
Thankfully, the relative simplicity of the machine learning 
model deployed by the researchers in this instance allowed them 
to detect, reverse engineer, and remedy the situation before any 
harmful behavior resulted.121 Indeed, the algorithm taught hu-
mans something about the flaws in existing care techniques. But 
that is a luxury which will not be afforded to all robot designers.122 
Indeed, as Dr. Marc Canellas et al. have convincingly argued, the 
likelihood of these types of unpredictable events actually tends to 
rise alongside the complexity of computational models, even 
though the overall likelihood of an abnormal event may remain 
constant.123 This phenomenon owes to the highly leptokurtic124 
failure curves often observed in complex systems, in which a “re-
duced likelihood of failure in a general sense” tends to be accom-
panied by an increased “likelihood of more severe failures.”125 
 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Caruana et al, Intelligible Models for HealthCare at 1722 (cited in note 117). 
 122 For example, IBM’s Watson, a supercomputer system trained to answer questions 
posed in natural language, was recently reported as displaying “multiple examples of un-
safe and incorrect treatment recommendations.” Jennings Brown, IBM Watson Reportedly 
Recommended Cancer Treatments That Were “Unsafe and Incorrect” (Gizmodo, July 25, 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/Z544-TH4K. 
 123 Marc C. Canellas, et al, Framing Human-Automation Regulation: A New Modus 
Operandi from Cognitive Engineering *41 (We Robot Conference Working Paper, Mar 
2017), archived at http://perma.cc/ZVM5-T54N. 
 124 Leptokurtic distributions show higher peaks around mean values and higher den-
sities of values at the tail ends of the probability curve. 
 125 Canellas, et al, Framing Human-Automation Regulation at *41 (cited in note 123). 
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6. Systemic harms. 
People have long assumed that robots are inherently “neu-
tral” and “objective,” given that robots simply intake data and 
systematically output results.126 But they are actually neither. Ro-
bots are only as “neutral” as the data they are fed and only as 
“objective” as the design choices of those who create them. When 
either bias or subjectivity infiltrates a system’s inputs or design 
choices, it is inevitably reflected in the system’s outputs.127 Ac-
cordingly, those responsible for overseeing the deployment of ro-
bots must anticipate the possibility that algorithmically biased 
applications will cause harms of this systemic nature to third  
parties. 
Robots trained on poorly curated data sets, for example, run 
the risk of simply perpetuating existing biases by continuing to 
favor historical haves against have-nots. In such instances, differ-
ent outcome distributions in the data reflecting racial, ethnic,  
 
 126 See Lori G. Kletzer, The Question with AI Isn’t Whether We’ll Lose Our Jobs—It’s 
How Much We’ll Get Paid (Harvard Business Review, Jan 31, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L5KY-XE4X (“Currently, most automation involves routine, structured, 
predictable physical activities and the collection and processing of data.”). 
 127 See generally Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases 
Inequality and Threatens Democracy (Penguin 2016). 
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social, or economic disparities can become self-fulfilling prophe-
cies—leaving already marginalized groups at the mercy of past 
injustices.128 
Similarly, the algorithmic goals and subgoals that define ro-
bot behavior can also lead to biased results. After all, each deci-
sion in the process of developing an algorithm necessarily reflects 
the values of its designers. And when designers fail to consider 
particular stakeholders, or fail to specify goals that accurately 
map onto their desired outcomes, their robots may unfairly privi-
lege certain individuals or groups over others. Hence, mathema-
tician Cathy O’Neil’s provocative description of an algorithm as 
an “opinion[ ] embedded in mathematics.”129 
Instances of bias or subjectivity infiltrating robotics systems 
are already well documented. A recent example comes from the 
car insurance industry. US law obliges all car owners to purchase 
insurance for their vehicles. But not all premiums are created 
equal. A recent study by Consumer Reports found that contempo-
rary premiums depended “less on driving habits and increasingly 
on socioeconomic factors,” including an individual’s credit score.130 
After analyzing “2 billion [car insurance] price quotes across ap-
proximately 700 companies,” the study found that “[c]redit scores 
. . . factored into [insurance] algorithms so heavily that perfect 
drivers with low credit scores often paid substantially more than 
terrible drivers with high scores.”131 The study’s findings raised 
widespread concerns that AI systems used to generate these 
quotes could “create negative feedback loops that are hard to 
break.”132 According to one expert, “Higher insurance prices for 
low-income people can translate to higher debt and plummeting 
credit scores, which can mean reduced job prospects, which allows 
debt to pile up, credit scores to sink lower, and insurance rates to 
increase in a vicious cycle.”133 Similar examples of robotics sys-
tems causing, or threating to cause, systemic harms have been 
 
 128 See Selbst, 52 Ga L Rev at 133–35 (cited in note 59). 
 129 See O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction at 16 (cited in note 127). 
 130 Illinois Radio Network, How Are Car Insurance Rates Set? (WSIU, July 31, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/X74X-J74D. A credit score “summarizes an individual’s credit 
history and financial activities in a way that informs the bank about their creditworthi-
ness.” Lydia T. Liu, et al, Delayed Impact of Fair Machine Learning (Berkeley Artificial 
Intelligence Research, May 17, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/GGM6-KPPM. 
 131 Christina Couch, Ghosts in the Machine (NOVA, Oct 25, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/98JM-4PLW. 
 132 See id. 
 133 Id. 
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documented in the domains of predictive policing, criminal sen-
tencing, targeted advertising, search optimization, and facial 
recognition, among many others.134 
To be sure, all advantages are comparative. AI may replicate 
bias in existing legal systems. But it also has the potential to re-
duce that bias by replacing human instinct with actual metrics.135 
Used properly, AIs can reduce bias by replacing subjectivity with 
objectivity.136 But it is important that those new objective 
measures don’t simply replicate the problems of their subjective 
predecessors. 
As we continue to invite robots into our homes, personal lives, 
and places of work, the types of collateral risks they pose to our 
privacy, security, environment, and even livelihoods will also 
 
 134 See, for example, Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 Stan L Rev 
Online 55, 57 (2013) (warning of the capacity for big data to systematically marginalize 
people who, “whether due to poverty, geography, or lifestyle . . . are less ‘datafied’ than 
the general population[ ]”); Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, et al, The Ethics of Algorithms: Map-
ping the Debate, 3 Big Data & Society 1, 8 (2016) (discussing how profiling by algorithms, 
which “identify correlations and make predictions about behavior at a group-level, . . . can 
inadvertently create an evidence-base that leads to discrimination”); Danielle Keats  
Citron and Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 
89 Wash L Rev 1, 10–18 (2014) (describing the potential for “black box” credit scoring to 
produce arbitrary results that reinforce inequality); Solon Barocas, Data Mining and the 
Discourse on Discrimination (Proceedings of the Data Ethics Workshop, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/G9NA-6B7V (explaining the potential harms created by data mining 
with an example of how predictive policing can produce feedback loops that distort policing 
priorities); Bart Custers, Data Dilemmas in the Information Society: Introduction and 
Overview, in Bart Custers, et al, eds, Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Soci-
ety 3, 22 (Springer-Verlag 2013) (describing how algorithmic “affirmative action” could be 
used to address gender discrimination in salary predictions); Latanya Sweeney, Discrim-
ination in Online Ad Delivery, in 56 Communications of the ACM 44, 50–51 (2013) (docu-
menting a statistically significant difference in the number of Google AdSense advertise-
ments that included words such as “arrest” and “criminal” when searching black-
associated versus white-associated names); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Cap-
italism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J Information Tech 75, 81–82 
(2015) (warning of the “chilling effects of anticipatory conformity” that emerge from “a 
ubiquitous networked institutional regime that records, modifies, and commodifies every-
day experience . . . all with a view to establishing new pathways to monetization and 
profit”); Crawford and Schultz, 55 BC L Rev at 101 (cited in note 2) (explaining how big 
data can provide sophisticated tools to housing suppliers that allow subtler versions of 
housing discrimination to persist). The problem is not just explicit bias, but the consider-
ation of variables with a disparate impact on particular groups. See Selbst, 52 Ga L Rev 
at 133–35 (cited in note 59). 
 135 See generally, for example, Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 Wash U L 
Rev 771 (2017) (explaining how statistical analysis of prosecutorial discretion can provide 
better information necessary to reduce bias and misconduct). 
 136 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases (working paper, 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/5D72-XL6L (arguing that algorithms can be better than 
humans at avoiding consideration of race or other factors). 
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grow in kind. Some harms, after all, simply arise as a by-product 
of pervasiveness. And the threat of these types of harms emerging 
will be especially true in modern robots, given that they often 
combine the uncertainties of machine learning, the “promiscuity 
of data,”137 the inherent security risks of computational systems, 
and the threat of physically affecting the real world. 
Take, for example, the now commonplace phenomenon of in-
viting “Internet of Things”138 (IoT) devices, such as an Amazon 
Echo or Google Home, into our homes to monitor our every utter-
ance. For many (ourselves included), the convenience of simply 
issuing a voice command to set a cookie timer, play a song, or or-
der a cab can be too good to pass up. Yet, in exchange for the ca-
pabilities offered by these powerful voice recognition bots, we 
must also accept the reality of their 24-7 surveillance of our most 
intimate settings. 
Data collection practices of this magnitude will not only pre-
sent legal oversight challenges to those tasked with gathering it, 
but also present novel challenges for those seeking to secure ro-
bots against external threats. As Professor Balkin notes, “the 
more opportunities for innovation, the more possible targets for 
hacking.”139 Accordingly, the very same applications that now 
gather unprecedented amounts of data from users are also likely 
to pose unprecedented risks in the event that such data gets into 
the wrong hands. 
Even if they aren’t hacked, the mere presence of these devices 
can change human behavior. People act differently when they 
think they are being watched or listened to, even if the thing do-
ing the watching is only a picture of a pair of eyes taped to the 
computer.140 And if a robot is in your house, you’re not just imag-
ining it: it probably is watching and listening to you.141 
 
 137 This phrase comes from Professor Calo and refers to the fact that digital infor-
mation “faces few natural barriers to dissemination.” See Calo, 103 Cal L Rev at 532–34 
(cited in note 2). 
 138 The “Internet of Things” refers to the embedding of networked devices in everyday 
objects, thereby allowing them to gather, send, and receive data. 
 139 Balkin, 6 Cal L Rev Cir at 53 (cited in note 2). See also James Grimmelmann, 
Regulation by Software, 114 Yale L J 1719, 1742–43 (2005). 
 140 See Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technol-
ogy Scholarship, 114 Penn St L Rev 809, 838–42 (2010); Kaminski, et al, 76 Md L Rev at 
997, 1001–24 (cited in note 103) (noting this problem and offering design principles to 
minimize it). 
 141 For a discussion of the implications of household robots for American privacy law, 
see generally Margot E. Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed To?, 
51 Idaho L Rev 661 (2015). 
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Add to this brave new reality the awesome power of cloud 
computing and networking technologies, and the threat of collat-
eral harms is only exacerbated. Armies of robots linked through 
networking technologies will enable single, centralized systems to 
impact our physical and digital environments in profound new 
ways. Seemingly microscopic design choices within systems con-
trolling fleets of tens of thousands of autonomous vehicles, for ex-
ample, could produce macroscopic effects including changes to 
traffic patterns, transportation pricing, congestion, and even en-
ergy grid usage. We may, for example, wake up one morning to 
discover that Google Maps has routed highway traffic through our 
quiet neighborhood streets. Such a decision harms people who 
never use Google Maps or self-driving cars. But so might its op-
posite. Suppose, instead, that the same routing algorithm avoided 
residential areas entirely, causing greater congestion on high-
ways and interstates than was socially optimal. 
II.  REMEDIES AND ROBOTS 
The injuries we described in the last Part will lead to lawsuits 
of various types. Indeed, they already have.142 We don’t intend to 
discuss all the ways courts might apply the substantive law to 
those legal harms. There is a growing literature doing just that.143 
Rather, our focus is on the practical endgame of these coming law-
suits: the law of remedies. Having identified a wrong, courts try 
to make it right by applying various remedies. But as we will see 
below, when the defendant is a robot (or its owner), that can be 
easier said than done. In Part II.A we summarize the law of  
remedies. In Part II.B we examine the fundamental nature of 
 
 142 See, for example, Complaint for Damages, Nilsson v General Motors LLC, No 3:18-
cv-00471, *3–4 (ND Cal filed Jan 22, 2018) (litigation alleging that an autonomous vehicle 
operated by General Motors operated itself negligently); O’Brien v Intuitive Surgical, Inc, 
2011 WL 3040479, *1 (ND Ill) (litigation involving injuries allegedly caused by the “da 
Vinci surgical robot”); Hills v Fanuc Robotics America, Inc, 2010 WL 890223, *1, 4 (ED La) 
(litigation by employee injured by a robot used to stack crates on wooden pallets); Kharpal, 
Robot with $100 Bitcoin Buys Drugs (cited in note 73) (describing the “curious story of how 
a robot armed with a weekly budget of $100 in bitcoin managed to buy Ecstasy, a  
Hungarian passport and a baseball cap with a built-in camera—before getting arrested”). 
 143 See generally, for example, Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehi-
cles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 Cal L 
Rev 1611 (2017); Kenneth S. Abraham and Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Man-
ufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 Va L Rev 
127 (2019); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 Mich 
St L Rev 1; A. Michael Froomkin and P. Zak Colangelo, Self-Defense against Robots and 
Drones, 48 Conn L Rev 1 (2015). 
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remedies law, detailing the “normative” and “economic” views as 
well as the practical implications of robots internalizing one view 
or the other. Having laid out the legal and moral foundations of 
remedies and robots, we then discuss how the technology will 
mesh with or challenge the various mechanisms our remedies 
rules currently rely on to deter, promote, or compensate for par-
ticular behaviors. 
A. The Law of Remedies 
A remedy, broadly defined, is anything that a judicial body 
can do for an individual who has been harmed or is threatened 
with harm. Remedies are the means by which substantive law is 
given its actual effect. Once a plaintiff is adjudged to have suf-
fered harm under the laws governing primary rights and duties, 
the law must provide a remedy for those rights and duties to have 
meaning. Without a remedy, lawfulness and unlawfulness are 
rendered merely nominal distinctions—or, as it is often more 
pithily phrased, “No right without a remedy.”144 
There are two fundamental kinds of remedies: those that are 
“compensatory” and those that are “preventative.”145 Compensa-
tory remedies aspire to address the wrongs suffered by an indi-
vidual through monetary transfers between plaintiff and defend-
ant, compensating the plaintiff for the injury suffered. 
Preventative remedies, meanwhile, aspire to avoid this transfer 
entirely. They seek to discourage, avert, or literally undo harm, 
rather than retrospectively compensating victims once harm has 
occurred. Some preventative remedies accomplish this aim by 
threatening lawbreakers with damages, specific performance, or 
restitution in an effort to deter unlawful conduct. But sometimes 
courts seek to prevent harm more directly by enjoining individu-
als from acting or, less commonly, ordering them to take affirma-
tive steps to avoid violating the law.146 
One goal of remedies law is to make plaintiffs whole by re-
storing them to the condition they would have been in “but for” 
the wrong—what Professor Douglas Laycock calls restoring the 
“plaintiff’s rightful position.”147 Traditionally, this compensatory 
 
 144 Frederick Pollock, The Continuity of the Common Law, 11 Harv L Rev 423, 424 
(1898) (noting the phrase already functioned as a “maxim” in the 19th century). 
 145 Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 3 (Aspen 4th ed 2010). 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id at 14–15. 
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goal has focused on the plaintiff in the dispute—presumably a le-
gal person.148 Compensation is normally accomplished through 
the award of legal damages. 
But remedies law also focuses substantial attention on de-
fendants. Equitable restitutionary remedies such as unjust en-
richment, disgorgement, and constructive trust are designed not 
to compensate plaintiffs but to deprive defendants of the benefit 
of wrongful acts. These remedies are designed not to make the 
plaintiff whole, but to make the defendant “whole” (in the sense 
that he is no better off than he would have been but for the  
wrongdoing).149 
Injunctive relief can serve the purpose of putting either the 
plaintiff or the defendant in her rightful position. Injunctions or-
der the defendant not to act (or, less commonly, to take some af-
firmative act). Generally, injunctions are designed to prevent a 
future harm or stop an ongoing one. But they can also aim to 
make affirmative changes in the world by seeking to change ex-
isting structures that have led to past injuries.150 
Remedies law also contains many elements of moral judg-
ment, punishment, and deterrence.151 For instance, the law will 
often act to deprive the defendant of gains, even if the result is a 
windfall to the plaintiff, because we think it is unfair to let the 
defendant keep those gains. Courts may also enhance damages 
 
 148 It is possible to imagine robot plaintiffs. Robots can certainly be injured by hu-
mans. You might run a stop light and hit my self-driving car, for example. Or people might 
attack a robot. See, for example, Isobel Asher Hamilton, People Kicking These Food Deliv-
ery Robots Is an Early Insight into How Cruel Humans Could Be to Robots (Business In-
sider, June 9, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/LRL3-PMF2 (the headline says it all); 
Russ Mitchell, Humans Slapped and Shouted at Robot Cars in Two of Six DMV Crash 
Reports This Year (LA Times, Mar 5, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/4XT2-WLJW; Sil-
icon Valley Security Robot Attacked by Drunk Man—Police (BBC News, Apr 26, 2017), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9MT8-3FU2. The robot itself presumably won’t have a right to 
sue, at least for the foreseeable future. But the owner of the robot might sue for damages. 
That doesn’t seem to present significant remedies issues different from ordinary property 
damages cases, though. Valuing the loss of an individual robot or AI that has learned in 
ways that differ from factory settings may present difficulties akin to the valuation of any 
unique asset. But that’s likely to be rare, since people will presumably back up their 
unique AIs periodically. 
 149 Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 11–15 (cited in note 145). 
 150 Courts do this when they order structural reforms to prisons, hospitals, or schools, 
for instance. See, for example, Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 685–88 (1978) (upholding a 
district court order placing a maximum limit of thirty days on punitive solitary confine-
ment). But see, for example, Missouri v Jenkins, 515 US 70, 86–103 (1995) (rejecting the 
district court’s desegregation plan, which required the State of Missouri to increase fund-
ing for staff and remedial programs, because it was beyond the court’s remedial authority). 
 151 Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 4, 7–8 (cited in note 145). 
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beyond what is necessary to compensate plaintiffs or deprive de-
fendants of profits in order to punish behaviors we deem  
reprehensible. 
Most of these noncompensatory remedies laws were explicitly 
designed to change the behavior of people. But the remedial 
mechanisms used to shape human behavior cannot be relied upon 
to do the same when machines, not people, engage in harmful con-
duct. The remainder of this Part considers some of the complica-
tions that robots bring to various remedies rules. 
B. The Nature of Remedies 
This Section examines the principles that motivate the law of 
remedies and how robots complicate our traditional understand-
ing. In Part II.B.1 we explain the normative and economic per-
spectives on the substantive law of remedies. In Part II.B.2 we 
examine how remedies law must adapt to accommodate robots. 
1. Normative versus economic perspectives. 
The choice of remedy for a given legal violation often stems 
from fundamental assumptions regarding the nature of the sub-
stantive law itself. Two views predominate. A “normative” view of 
substantive law sees it as a prohibition against certain conduct, 
with the remedy being whatever is prescribed by the law itself. 
The defendant, on this view, has engaged in a wrongful act that 
we would stop if we could. But because it is not always possible to 
do so—commonly because the act has already occurred—remedies 
law seeks to do the next best thing: compensate the plaintiff for 
the damage done. This view is consistent with laws enforced by 
property rules.152 
An alternative view of substantive law, however, conceptual-
izes the role of remedies differently. Under this “economic” view, 
the substantive law alone forbids nothing. Rather, it merely spec-
ifies the foreseeable consequences of various choices, with the 
available remedies signaling the particular penalties associated 
with particular conduct. Damages, on this view, are simply a cost 
of doing business—one we want defendants to internalize but not 
necessarily to avoid the conduct altogether.153 This approach is 
 
 152 See generally Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972). 
 153 See Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal  
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027, 1032–33 (1995). But see Louis 
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more commonly associated with liability rather than property 
rules.154 
To help illustrate the difference between these two views, 
consider an everyday encounter with a traffic light. Under the 
normative view, a red light stands as a prohibition against trav-
eling through an intersection, with the remedy being a ticket or 
fine against those who are caught breaking the prohibition. We 
would stop you from running the red light if we could. But because 
policing every intersection in the country would be impossible, we 
instead punish those we do catch in hopes of deterring others. 
Under the economic view, however, an absolute prohibition 
against running red lights was never the intention. Rather, the 
red light merely signals a consequence for those who do, in fact, 
choose to travel through the intersection. As in the first instance, 
the remedy available is a fine or a ticket. But under this view, the 
choice of whether or not to violate the law depends on the willing-
ness of the lawbreaker to accept the penalty. 
In one of his more arresting turns of phrase, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr famously described the economic view of sub-
stantive law as that of a “bad man.” According to Justice Holmes: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look 
at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material conse-
quences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as 
a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside 
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of con-
science.155 
The measure of the substantive law, in other words, is not to be 
mixed up with moral qualms, but is simply coextensive with its 
remedy—no more and no less. 
While some law and economics scholars accept this precept 
as fundamental, in many behavioral contexts it does not tell the 
entire story. Although the actual consequences associated with 
lawbreaking play a substantial role in much of human decision-
making, many individuals nonetheless view law as having  
 
Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres 
and Talley, 105 Yale L J 221, 225–30 (1995) (critiquing Ayres and Talley’s argument “that, 
when bargaining is imperfect, ‘liability rules possess an “information-forcing” quality’ that 
‘may induce both more contracting and more efficient contracting than property rules’”). 
 154 See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1092 (cited in note 152). 
 155 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457, 459 (1897). 
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distinctly normative underpinnings. As Laycock notes, “It is cer-
tainly true that some individuals will obey the law only if the con-
sequences of violation are more painful than obedience,” but the 
fact that “some individuals are unmoved does not eliminate the 
statement’s moral force for the rest of us.”156 
An illustrative example of this phenomenon in action comes 
from the Ohio case French v Dwiggins157 involving a fatal motor-
cycle accident.158 At issue was a recently passed statute expanding 
the avenues of recovery available to plaintiffs who pursued 
wrongful death claims. The court wrote that, although the expan-
sion of remedies coincided with the timing of the accident, the de-
fendant “could not reasonably be expected to conduct his affairs 
differently” than he would have under the prior regime.159 The 
court reasoned that when it came to this life and death matter, 
the marginal differences in available remedies played no role in 
the defendant’s decision-making leading up to the accident. 
Justice Holmes, himself, could hardly have been said to disa-
gree with the court’s reasoning.160 Despite his provocative use of 
the “bad man” metaphor to clarify the role of the legal rules for 
those acting out of pure self-interest, he understood the com-
plex—and oftentimes competing—roles that normative concerns 
play in everyday decision-making.161 
2. Bad men and good robots. 
People are rarely forced to grapple with the distinctions  
between the normative or economic view of substantive law.162 
 
 156 Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 7 (cited in note 145). See also generally 
Yuval Feldman, The Law of Good People: Challenging States’ Ability to Regulate Human 
Behavior (Cambridge 2018) (arguing that we should focus legal rules on the signals they 
send to good people rather than just constraining the behavior of bad people). 
 157 458 NE2d 827 (Ohio 1984). 
 158 Id at 827. 
 159 Id at 831. 
 160 See Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes’s Bad Man, 79 Fordham L Rev 
2069, 2069 (2011): 
[A] careful reading of Holmes suggests that he was himself well aware of the 
intimate relationship between law and morality, and seems to have recognized, 
somewhat surprisingly, that only by engaging in an analytical separation of 
these two concepts can they then be normatively reunited in an intellectually 
consistent and satisfying manner. 
 161 Id at 2103–06. 
 162 Corporations are more likely to do so. Because we can’t put a corporation itself in 
jail, corporate compliance—even with penalties designed to stop conduct rather than just 
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But robots, or at least their programmers, are afforded no such 
luxury. Sure, robots can be prohibited from engaging in certain 
types of conduct, assuming their designers understand and con-
trol the algorithm by which they make decisions. But implement-
ing a legal remedy via computer code necessarily involves adopt-
ing either a normative or economic view of the substantive law. 
That’s because a true “prohibition” can only be communicated 
to a computer system in one of two basic ways: it can be encoded 
in the form of an “IF, THEN”163 statement that prevents a robot 
from engaging in particular types of conduct, or it can be coded as 
a negative weight for engaging in that same conduct. An IF, 
THEN statement operates like an injunction, while a weight in a 
decision-making algorithm operates like a liability rule. 
Returning to the example of the red light, a programmer 
seeking to prohibit a robot from breaking the law could do so with 
an IF, THEN statement along the lines of: “If the robot encounters 
a red light, then it will not travel into the intersection.” Similarly, 
a programmer seeking to achieve that same prohibition in a prob-
abilistic system could do so by assigning an infinitely high nega-
tive consequence to traveling into the intersection when the light 
is red. 
An IF, THEN statement is an absolute rule. If a triggering 
event occurs, then a particular consequence must inexorably fol-
low. As a practical matter, so is an infinitely negative weight. 
Both achieve the functionally equivalent result of prohibiting the 
unlawful conduct—the goal of a normative vision of substantive 
law. But in order to achieve this normative vision, the prohibition 
must be implemented without regard for the cost of a ticket. 
Because the law is encoded as an absolute in its program-
ming, the robot will always obey the law. That’s not true of people. 
If we want legal rules to be self-executing, the ability to impose 
perfect obedience may be a good thing. 
By contrast, if the underlying theory of a remedy is economic, 
the machine’s decision-making calculus is fundamentally differ-
ent. Once more, the example of the traffic light helps to clarify 
this distinction. To an economist, the substantive law and its rem-
edy do not signal a “self-executing refusal to ever run a red light” 
 
internalize costs—might nonetheless be viewed as a cost of doing business for the  
corporation. 
 163 An IF, THEN statement—or “if-then-else statement”—refers to an expression that 
conditionally executes a statement or group of statements. 
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but instead an understanding that “running a red light is associ-
ated with a small chance of a modest fine and a somewhat in-
creased chance of a traffic accident which will damage the car and 
may require the payment of damages to another.” Under this 
view, the remedy, and its risks, are both expressed in probabilistic 
terms. They translate into probabilistic costs within the robot’s 
overall decision-making calculus. Those costs won’t be infinite, 
unless perhaps the penalty is death.164 They will instead reflect a 
“price” for running a red light that the algorithm might decide to 
pay depending on what benefits light-running offers. 
Thus, under the economic view, the choice of whether to obey 
a law is, of necessity, the choice of a Holmesian “bad man.” Nor-
mative views of substantive law—which we know shape certain 
aspects of human behavior—cannot be expected to translate 
cleanly into the robotics context with their associated remedies 
intact. If we want robots to adopt normative views of the law, we 
will need outright prohibitions of the type that famously got Isaac 
Asimov’s robots into so much trouble.165 And imposing bans rather 
than simply calculating costs will make it hard for robots to 
achieve many things. After all, it’s hard to operate a robot with 
too many absolute prohibitions.166 And this will be particularly 
true of machine learning systems that develop their own algo-
rithms, making it difficult for engineers to reliably predict how 
encoded prohibitions will interact with other rules. 
Encoding the rule “don’t run a red light” as an absolute pro-
hibition, for example, might sometimes conflict with the more 
compelling goal of “not letting your driver die by being hit by an 
oncoming truck.” Humans know that “don’t run a red light” 
doesn’t really mean “don’t ever run a red light.” Rather it trans-
lates, roughly, to “don’t run a red light unless you have a suffi-
ciently good reason and it seems safe.” Likewise, even weightier 
normative prohibitions, such as “thou shalt not kill,” come with 
an implied “unless . . . .” But designers can’t put that in an IF, 
THEN statement unless they understand and specify all the ex-
ceptions to the rule. 
 
 164 And probably not even then, unless the robot’s algorithm preferences its own sur-
vival over most other outcomes (which it probably won’t). 
 165 Isaac Asimov, The Rest of the Robots 43 (Doubleday 1964) (remarking that “[t]here 
was just enough ambiguity in [Asimov’s] Three Laws [of robotics] to provide the conflicts 
and uncertainties required for new stories, and, to my great relief, it seemed always to be 
possible to think up a new angle out of the sixty-one words of the Three Laws”). 
 166 “Don’t become Skynet” does seem like a good one to include, though. See Randall 
Munroe, Genetic Algorithms (XKCD), archived at http://perma.cc/W6KZ-65SH. 
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More plausibly, robots operating in the real world will have 
to adopt algorithmic approaches to almost all complex problems 
that weigh particular actions against various goals and risks. As 
a result, the role of remedies in discouraging socially detrimental 
conduct will need to be reimagined in terms of cost internaliza-
tion,167 as opposed to normative sanction or punishment. Deter-
rence makes sense where we are trying to affect individual behav-
ior. But the logical way to “deter” a machine is to put the actual 
costs into the calculus it uses to make the decision. In practice, 
that translates into quantifying, and then operationalizing, the 
price we want robots to have to pay if they take certain actions 
we want to deter.168 And under the broadest interpretation of the 
economic view, even doctrines seemingly designed to prevent or 
deter conduct—like injunctions or prison sentences—could 
simply be construed as costs, albeit very high ones. 
That said, we think it makes more sense to distinguish be-
tween remedies designed to internalize costs and those designed 
to enjoin, deter, or punish behavior.169 While some defendants 
faced with the latter may treat punitive damages or even prison 
sentences as mere costs of doing business, the remedy’s ultimate 
intent is to deter unlawful conduct, not to simply internalize its 
social costs. 
For the vast majority of applications, legal remedies will 
likely be incorporated into machines through their “economic” for-
mulation—resulting in robots that, by design, adopt this view of 
substantive law exclusively. Unless specifically programmed oth-
erwise, distinctions between normative and economic goals will 
be utterly lost on robots. Thus, while it may be true to say that it 
is the rare “individual[ ] [who] will obey the law only if the conse-
quences of violation are more painful than obedience,”170 this will 
be definitionally true of robots. And for reasons made clear in vir-
tually every sci-fi plot line featuring robots, it will only be on the 
rarest of occasions that it actually makes sense to completely bar 
robots from engaging in certain types of conduct. 
 
 167 By “internalization,” we do not necessarily mean that the law should attempt to 
put an explicit monetary value on every conceivable form of harmful conduct. Rather, in-
ternalities and externalities can be addressed by a multitude of direct and indirect means, 
just as the law does today. 
 168 See Casey, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1357–59 (cited in note 2). 
 169 See generally Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum L Rev 1523 (1984) 
(discussing this distinction and how to choose between them). 
 170 Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 7 (cited in note 145). 
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It thus appears that Justice Holmes’s archetypical “bad man” 
will finally be brought to corporeal form, though ironically, not as 
a man at all. And if Justice Holmes’s metaphorical subject is truly 
“morally impoverished and analytically deficient,” as some ac-
cuse, it will have significant ramifications for robots.171 
C. Teaching Robots to Behave 
Each of the major types and purposes of remedies we identi-
fied in Part II.A will face challenges as applied to robots and AI. 
In this Section, we consider each in turn. 
1. Who pays? 
The first purpose of damages—to compensate plaintiffs for 
their losses and so return them to their rightful position—is per-
haps the easiest to apply to robots. True, robots don’t have any 
money (unless we count the one that was recently arrested by 
Swiss police after going on a black-market shopping spree with 
$100 worth of Bitcoin).172 So they generally can’t actually pay 
damage awards themselves.173 In fact, the European Parliament 
specifically cited this fact in its recommendation against giving 
robots personhood, noting that they are not fully functioning 
members of society that could afford to pay their debts.174 
But this problem is hardly insurmountable. The law will rise 
to the challenge. Someone built the robots, after all. And someone 
owns them. So if a robot causes harm, it may make sense for the 
company behind it to pay, just as when a defective machine 
causes harm today. 
 
 171 Consider Christoph Bezemek, Bad for Good: Perspectives on Law and Force, in 
Christoph Bezemek and Nicoletta Ladavac, eds, The Force of Law Reaffirmed: Frederick 
Schauer Meets the Critics 15 (Springer 2016) (arguing that the perspective of the 
Holmesian “bad man” is useful for understanding the “general relationship between law 
and force”). 
 172 See Kharpal, Robot with $100 Bitcoin Buys Drugs (cited in note 73). See also 
Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 
108 Nw U L Rev 1485, 1495 (2014) (explaining how tort and contract law can regulate 
“autonomous systems”). 
 173 See United States v Athlone Industries, Inc, 746 F2d 977, 979 (3d Cir 1984) (noting 
that “robots cannot be sued”). See also Roger Michalski, How to Sue a Robot, 2018 Utah L 
Rev 1021, 1063–64 (arguing that robots should be a new form of entity for litigation  
purposes). 
 174 See European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Report with Recommenda-
tions to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robots *16–17 (Jan 27, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/JM8H-DYAV. 
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But it’s not that easy. Robots are composed of many complex 
components, learning from their interactions with thousands, 
millions, or even billions of data points, and they are often de-
signed, operated, leased, or owned by different companies. Which 
party is to internalize these costs? The one that designed the robot 
or AI in the first place? The one that collected and curated the 
data set used to train its algorithm in unpredictable ways? The 
users who bought the robot and deployed it in the field? Some-
times all of these roles will be one in the same, falling upon indi-
viduals operating in a single company, as was arguably the case 
when a self-driving Uber car killed a pedestrian in Tempe,  
Arizona.175 
In such instances, assigning responsibility may be easy. But 
often the chain of legal responsibility will be more complicated. Is 
a self-flying passenger drone an inherently dangerous product? If 
so, one set of rules might apply depending on whether a passenger 
or, instead, a third party is injured. Is the injury caused by this 
hypothetical drone the result of a design defect? If so, it may be 
the designer who should bear the risk.176 But suppose instead that 
the injury was the result of a software defect that a different de-
signer introduced through an aftermarket modification. Here, the 
law commonly shifts responsibility away from the manufacturer 
if the modification was one that the manufacturer didn’t intend.177 
Indeed, companies regularly void warranties when third parties 
modify their products or use them in unexpected ways. Things 
will get even more complicated if, as seems likely, some or all of 
the robot code is open source, raising the question of who ulti-
mately is responsible for the code that goes into the robot.178 
Robot designers, owners, operators, and users will, of course, 
fight over who bears true legal responsibility for causing the robot 
to behave the way it did. And these complex distinctions don’t 
even account for the role of third parties causing robots to behave 
in adverse ways, as recently happened when Microsoft’s chatbot, 
 
 175 See Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian (cited in note 20). 
 176 See Geistfeld, 105 Cal L Rev at 1634–35 (cited in note 143). 
 177 See Daniel A. Crane, Kyle D. Logue, and Bryce C. Pilz, A Survey of Legal Issues 
Arising from the Deployment of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 Mich Telecomm 
& Tech L Rev 191, 215 (2017). 
 178 See Lothar Determann and Bruce Perens, Open Cars, 32 Berkeley Tech L J 915, 
984–86 (2017); Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 Md L Rev 571, 601–11 (2011) (proposing a 
liability regime for open-source robots that would balance the goals of fostering innovation 
and incentivizing safety). 
2019] Remedies for Robots 1353 
 
Tay, turned into a proverbial Nazi after interacting with trolls on 
Twitter.179 
These problems aren’t new, of course. Suppliers in a product 
chain have blamed each other when things go wrong for a long 
time, and courts have had to sort those claims out. Responsibility 
issues for robots too can, and will, eventually be resolved by the 
courts. But long before any consensus is reached, we should ex-
pect no shortage of finger-pointing, as different companies and 
individuals clamor to shift responsibility for harms to others in 
the causal chain—whether just to minimize their costs or because 
there are legitimate disputes about how the behavior of different 
actors in the chain interacted to cause the harm. And there may 
be one important difference between past disputes and those in-
volving robots: if the AI is self-learning, we may really never know 
who is to blame.180 
2. Law as action: shaping the behavior of rabota 
economicus. 
The second prong of the remedies triad—damage awards and 
equitable remedies designed to internalize costs and deter so-
cially unproductive behavior—will likely prove even more prob-
lematic. If we want to deter a robot, we need to make sure that it 
is programmed to account for the consequences of its actions. Em-
bedding this type of decision-making in robots often means quan-
tifying the various consequences of actions and instructing the 
robot to maximize the expected net monetary benefits of its  
behavior. 
This might sound like heaven to an economist. Finally, we 
will have a truly rational homo economicus (or, more accurately, 
a rabota economicus)181 who will internalize the social costs of its 
actions (at least insofar as those costs are accurately calculated 
in the courts) and modify its behavior accordingly. And if machine 
learning systems estimate these costs correctly, robots will be 
 
 179 See Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot to Be a Racist Asshole (cited in 
note 23). See also text accompanying notes 97–102. In retrospect, this event probably 
should have been a wake-up call for 2016. 
 180 See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent 
and Causation, 31 Harv J L & Tech 889, 931–32 (2018) (opposing strict liability for this 
reason). 
 181 See Science Diction: The Origin of the Word ‘‘Robot’’ (NPR, Apr 22, 2011), archived 
at http://perma.cc/GCT6-3VLU (noting that “[the word ‘robot’] comes from an Old Church 
Slavonic word, rabota, which means servitude of forced labor”). 
1354 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1311 
 
“Learned” indeed—presumably deciding to do harm only when it 
is socially optimal (that is, when B < PL).182 
But not so fast. Things are more complicated. Robots won’t 
reflexively care about money. They will do whatever we program 
them to do. We can align robot incentives with social incentives 
by properly pricing, punishing, or deterring the companies that 
design, train, own, or operate robots. Those companies, in turn, 
should internalize the relevant costs of their robots’ actions. It 
might be reasonable to assume that corporations and people want 
to maximize their rational self-interest and will, thus, program 
their robots accordingly. But not all will, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. There are at least three potential problems. 
First, the goal of cost internalization through legal liability 
can only be accomplished by proxy. And it isn’t clear who the 
proxy will be. All the problems we noted in the prior section about 
assigning responsibility to compensate victims will return in 
spades as we try to force robots to account for the costs of their 
conduct. Even truly rational, profit-maximizing companies with 
perfect information about the costs of their actions won’t internal-
ize those costs unless they expect the legal system to hold them 
liable. If they are wrong, either in fearing liability when none ex-
ists or in believing someone else will foot the bill, their pricing 
will not accurately reflect reality. 
Second, we are unlikely to have anything resembling “per-
fect” information about the potential harms robots may cause. As 
noted in Part I, robots operating in complex environments can do 
a wide variety of harmful things. Some of those things we want to 
stop altogether. Some we want to discourage except in unusual 
circumstances. Some we want to outright permit but still price 
appropriately to account for externalities imposed on others. And 
some we want to permit despite their costs to society because the 
alternatives are worse. 
Getting robots to make socially beneficial, or morally “right,” 
decisions means we first need a good sense of all the things that 
could go wrong. Unfortunately, we’re already imperfect at that. 
Then we’d need to decide whether the conduct is something we 
want to ban, discourage, tax, or simply permit. Having done so, 
we would then need to decide who in the chain of robot design, 
training, ownership, and operation should be responsible for the 
 
 182 See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 171–73 (2d Cir 1947) (the 
case in which Judge Learned Hand first expressed his canonical negligence formula). 
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harm, if anyone. Then, we would need to figure out how likely 
each adverse outcome is in any given situation. Finally, we would 
need to assign a price to those potential harms—even the amor-
phous ones, such as a reduction in consumer privacy. And we’d 
want to balance those harms against reasonable alternatives to 
make sure the decision the robot made was the right one, even if 
it did cause harm. 
Our entire system of tort law has been trying to accomplish 
this feat for centuries. And it hasn’t worked very well. Indeed, 
most of tort is composed of standards, as opposed to hard and fast 
rules, for good reason. Standards give us the leeway to reserve 
judgment for later, when we might have a better idea of the actual 
facts leading up to an event. 
Tort law, for example, requires us to value injury, and—if we 
are to deter conduct—to decide on a multiplier to that value that 
serves as an optimal deterrent. While there are some circum-
stances in which we calculate these values formulaically,183 the 
primary way we do so is by leaving it to juries to pick the right 
number after an injury has already occurred. Effective deterrence 
in robots would, therefore, require accurate predictions about how 
juries might assess specific harmful events, not to mention a host 
of other computationally complex considerations. Scholars al-
ready find these types of predictions difficult, if not impossible, in 
the human context.184 And we know virtually nothing of how ju-
ries will react to harmful events caused by robots, particularly 
those exhibiting behaviors they can’t understand because the al-
gorithm is inscrutable.185 As we discuss below,186 this reality on 
the ground may even lead to feedback loops, in which the very act 
of trying to price harms in a decision-making algorithm changes 
the jury’s view of the robot’s responsibility.187 
The problem is even more complex than that, though, because 
robots don’t necessarily care about money. They will maximize 
 
 183 See, for example, H. Laurence Ross, Settled out of Court: The Social Process of 
Insurance Claims Adjustment 133–35 (Aldine 2d ed 1980) (discussing the routinization of 
negligence and insurance compensation formulas for auto accidents). 
 184 See Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 165–66 (cited in note 145) (discussing 
multiple studies showing disagreement among juries “over how to convert severity of in-
jury into dollars”). 
 185 See notes 231–32 and accompanying text. 
 186 See notes 288–89 and accompanying text. 
 187 See, for example, Malcolm Gladwell, The Engineer’s Lament: Two Ways of  
Thinking about Automotive Safety (The New Yorker, May 4, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6QSS-D3H3 (describing jurors’ horror at internal memos that seemed to 
callously weigh the value of human lives against business considerations). 
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whatever they are programmed to maximize. If we want them to 
internalize the costs of their behavior, we will need to put those 
costs in terms robots can understand—for example, as weights 
that go into a decision-making algorithm. That’s all well and good 
for robots already designed to maximize profit in purely monetary 
terms—say, a day-trading AI. But lots of robots will be designed 
with something other than money in mind. A policing or parole 
algorithm might minimize the likelihood that a released offender 
commits another crime. A weather-prediction system may max-
imize successful prediction outcomes. A surgery robot might max-
imize success in the surgery without considering certain side ef-
fects down the road. And a self-driving car might minimize time 
to destination subject to various constraints like generally obey-
ing traffic laws and reducing the risk of accidents. But to build 
deterrence into those algorithms, we must convert certain diver-
gent values into a common metric, whether it be money or  
something else. 
A third complexity involving rabota economicus emerges for 
economic costs that are not directly reflected by legal remedies. 
The cost of any given decision, after all, is not just a function of 
the legal system. In many instances, extralegal forces such as eth-
ical consumerism, corporate social responsibility, perception bias, 
and reputational costs will provide powerful checks on profit-
maximizing behaviors that might, otherwise, be expected to pro-
duce negative societal externalities.188 By pricing socially un- 
acceptable behavior through the threat of public backlash, these 
and other market forces help to fill some of the gaps left by exist-
ing remedies regimes. But they may open up other holes, creating 
rather than internalizing externalities. In fact, in certain circum-
stances, these factors may end up utterly swamping the costs of 
actual legal liability. For instance, if I make it clear that my car 
will kill its driver rather than run over a pedestrian if the issue 
arises, people might not buy my car. The economic cost of lost 
sales may swamp the costs of liability from a contrary choice. (In 
the other direction, car companies could run into PR problems if 
their cars run over kids.) Put simply, it is aggregate profits—not 
 
 188 See Casey, 111 Nw U L Rev at 1359 n 70 (cited in note 2) (discussing “the warped 
incentive signals conceivably sent [to robots] by transaction costs, first- and third-party 
insurance intermediaries, administrative costs, technical limitations, agency costs, infor-
mation costs, human error and incompetence, consumer psychology, potential media back-
lash, and judicial and regulatory uncertainty”). 
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just profits related to legal sanctions—that will drive robot  
decision-making. 
Further, even when a profit-maximizing corporation is 
wholly responsible for the conduct of a robot, incentives may 
misalign for other reasons. Corporations might want robots that 
maximize the long-term value of their brand even if doing so im-
poses unnecessary hidden costs. Conversely, they may task their 
robots with creating content that goes viral and, therefore, max-
imizes short-term visibility—even if it is divisive and potentially 
contrary to the corporation’s long-term interest. Corporations 
may also decide that first-mover advantages are worth the risk of 
causing some injury in order to capture a long-term market. 
“Move fast and break things” is a slogan in Silicon Valley, one 
that has served many disruptive tech companies well.189 But this 
same slogan can take on a somewhat more sinister cast when it 
is self-driving cars that are literally moving fast and breaking 
things. 
Corporations are also likely to be siloed in ways that interfere 
with effective cost internalization. Machine learning is a special-
ized programming skill, and programmers aren’t economists.190 
Even those who are employed by profit-maximizing companies in-
terested in effectively internalizing their legal costs may see no 
reason to take the law into account, or may not be very good at it 
even if they try to. They may resent constant interference from 
the legal department in their design decisions. And agency costs 
mean that different subgroups within companies may be moti-
vated by different incentives—as when sales divisions, manufac-
turing divisions, and service departments all get compensated 
based on different and potentially conflicting metrics.191 
Furthermore, designers aren’t the only people whose motiva-
tions we need to worry about. What a self-learning robot will max-
imize depends not only on what it is designed to do—the default 
optimizing function or functions that it starts with—but also how 
it learns. To efficiently deter behavior, we must be able to predict 
it. But if we don’t know how the robot will behave because it might 
 
 189 See generally Jonathan Taplin, Move Fast and Break Things: How Facebook, 
Google, and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undermined Democracy (Little, Brown 2017). 
 190 At least not most of them. 
 191 For a discussion of other agency costs that can arise in modern corporate struc-
tures, see Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum L Rev 863, 889–
95 (2013). 
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discover novel ways of achieving the goals we specify, simply pric-
ing in the cost of bad outcomes might have unpredictable effects, 
such as shutting down a new and better approach that produces 
some bad results but is nonetheless worth it. And even if it 
doesn’t, we once again have to confront the possibility that not all 
engineers will design their robots to maximize profit. Even if the 
designer of my self-driving car defaults to an algorithm that ap-
propriately balances the risks to everyone associated with driv-
ing, I might personally prefer a car that protects its passengers 
at the expense of pedestrians. And if I (or, more realistically, a car 
company that wants to market to me) instruct the car accordingly, 
simply pricing the social cost of accidents into the algorithm won’t 
modify behavior in the way we hope. 
This complex relationship between deterrence, responsibil-
ity, and financial liability does not, alone, differentiate robots 
from corporations or people. Deterrence is imperfect among hu-
mans, too, because humans aren’t motivated entirely by money 
and because they can’t always pay for the harm they cause. But 
what is different here is that the possibility of deterrence working 
at all will depend entirely on the robot’s code. A robot pro-
grammed to be indifferent to money won’t be deterred by any level 
of legal sanction. And while making the responsible legal party 
pay192 might encourage that party to design robots that do take 
adequate care, the division of responsibility between component 
makers, software designers, manufacturers, users, owners, and 
third parties means that the law must be careful about who ex-
actly it holds accountable.193 
D. Deterrence without Rational Actors: Is There Still a Role for 
Morality and Social Opprobrium in Robot Remedies? 
People often assume that robots are rational actors. But be-
cause robots act based upon their underlying code, that assump-
tion will not always manifest in ways we would expect of rational 
human actors. Our legal system needs to address that difference. 
In Part II.D.1, we consider equitable remedies in the context of 
 
 192 Or face time behind bars. 
 193 As it gets easier to design AIs, these entities will be increasingly judgment-proof. 
That will make us want to look upstream past the owner/user to the manufacturer. A 
second and more significant category of circumstances where a robot might depart from 
purely profit-maximizing behavior involves instances where the chain of legal responsibil-
ity running from the robot to the manufacturer is intermediated by a downstream user. 
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deterring “bad” robot behavior. In Part II.D.2, we consider puni-
tive damages and other forms of punishment. 
1. Equitable monetary relief and punishment. 
So far, we have focused on internalizing the costs of accidents 
or other injuries that result from otherwise socially desirable ac-
tivities, such as driving cars. But we also need to worry about 
genuinely “bad” behavior by robots that may merit prohibition. 
Many of our equitable monetary remedies are aimed at this sort 
of conduct. Their goal is not to make defendants internalize 
costs—to put a price on socially valuable behavior because of the 
costs it imposes—but to prevent the behavior. If you steal my car, 
the law says that you don’t get to keep it even if you value it more 
than me. Rather, you hold it in constructive trust for me.194 If you 
make profits by infringing my copyright or trade secret (but not 
my patent), the law will require you to disgorge those profits, pay-
ing me the money you made even if I never would have made it 
myself.195 We require defendants to give up such “unjust enrich-
ment,” not because we think we need to do so to compensate the 
plaintiff, but because we don’t want the defendant to have the 
money.196 
These equitable rules share some similarities with the cost-
internalization measures discussed in the last Section. But there 
are two key differences: (1) the money a defendant must pay is 
not limited to what is needed to compensate the plaintiff, and 
(2) the defendant must give up all gains, making the entire activ-
ity unprofitable. The focus here is not on the plaintiff’s rightful 
position but on the defendant’s rightful position. And in the class 
of cases in which we often use these remedies, the defendant’s 
rightful position is one in which she didn’t engage in the activity 
at all.197 
From an economic perspective, depriving defendants of their 
gains is simply a matter of coming up with a number. It might be 
greater than, equal to, or less than the damages we would other-
wise impose to internalize the costs of unlawful conduct or to re-
store the plaintiff’s rightful position. But there is something psy-
chologically effective about taking away a defendant’s gains 
 
 194 See Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 698–99 (cited in note 145). 
 195 Id at 655–63. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
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altogether. Indeed, in certain contexts, it might be a better means 
of deterring humans than the threat of paying compensatory 
damages, even if those damages turn out to be higher than a dis-
gorgement remedy would.198 When it comes to robots, however, 
there is little reason to think that the notion of taking “all your 
profits” will have the same psychological effects. True, if you set 
“profit = 0,” a profit-maximizing AI would not engage in the con-
duct. But that same logic would apply with equal force if the dam-
ages award made the activity unprofitable too. 
Remedies focused on the defendant’s rightful position do have 
one significant economic advantage over damages remedies in-
tended strictly as ex ante deterrents: we can calculate them after 
the fact once we have all the necessary information. If we want to 
use the threat of damages to deter conduct, we need to predict the 
likelihood and severity of the harm that the conduct will cause.199 
But if we care only about depriving the defendant of benefits on 
the theory that doing so will deter her, we just need to wait to set 
the number until the parties get to court and figure out how much 
the defendant actually gained. That often won’t be trivial. The 
benefit of stealing a trade secret, for example, can be as amor-
phous as a “quicker time to market” or a “more competitive prod-
uct.”200 But it’s still likely to be easier than predicting in advance 
who will be injured and by how much. 
This same calculus doesn’t work for injuries that are the by-
product of productive behavior. It doesn’t make sense to say that 
a self-driving car that hits a pedestrian should disgorge its prof-
its. It likely didn’t profit from hitting the pedestrian. And we don’t 
want to force defendants to disgorge all the value they make from 
 
 198 See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 
60 L & Contemp Probs 73, 76–77 (1997) (“[Because] an injurer is indifferent between no 
injury and an injury with liability for perfectly disgorging damages . . . an injurer who 
faces certain liability for extra-disgorging damages prefers not to cause the injury.”); Bert 
I. Huang, Essay, The Equipoise Effect, 116 Colum L Rev 1595, 1598 (2016). 
 199 See notes 183–87 and accompanying text. 
 200 See Mark Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law, 103 Iowa L Rev 245, 
266–69 (2017) (explaining when and how IP regimes should limit the “fruit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine” to trade secret infringement). For examples, see K-2 Ski Co v Head Ski 
Co, 506 F2d 471, 474 (9th Cir 1974) (“We are satisfied that the appropriate duration for 
the injunction should be the period of time it would have taken Head, either by reverse 
engineering or by independent development, to develop its ski legitimately without use of 
the K-2 trade secrets.”); Winston Research Co v Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co, 
350 F2d 134, 145–46 (9th Cir 1965) (discussing injunction protection for a machine com-
pany); Verigy US, Inc v Mayder, 2008 WL 564634, *9, 11 (ND Cal) (granting a five-month 
injunction to account for the lag time defendant would have faced in getting to market 
absent misappropriation). 
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driving. But defendant-focused equitable monetary remedies, like 
disgorgement or constructive trust, may have advantages for ro-
bot torts for which our goal is to stop the conduct altogether, not 
simply to price it efficiently. 
2. Detection, deterrence, and punitive damages. 
The fact that robots won’t be affected by the psychological im-
pact of certain remedies also has consequences for how we should 
think about the threat of detection. For a robot to be optimally 
deterred by remedies like disgorgement—which rely on human 
psychology to maximize their effects—we must also detect and 
sanction the misconduct 100 percent of the time.201 That, in turn, 
leads us to the problem of robots (or their masters) that hide  
misconduct. 
To be sure, many robot harms will be well-publicized. The 
spate of autonomous vehicle accidents covered by media in recent 
years provides one stark example. But countless robot harms will 
be of far subtler, so-called black box,202 varieties and will, there-
fore, be much harder to detect.203 
Makers and trainers of robots may have incentives to hide 
their behavior, particularly when it is profitable but illegal. If a 
company’s parole algorithm concludes (whether on the merits of 
the data or not) that black people should be denied parole more 
often than similarly situated white people, it might not want the 
world to know. And if you, as an owner, tweaked the algorithm on 
your car to run over pedestrians rather than put your own life at 
risk, you might seek to hide that too. We have already seen re-
markable efforts by companies conspiring to cover up wrongdoing, 
many of which succeeded for years.204 Often such conspiracies are 
 
 201 Theoretically this is true of people too if they are rational profit maximizers. But 
many won’t be. See, for example, Daniel L. McFadden, The New Science of Pleasure *23–
24, 37 (NBER Working Paper No 18687, Jan 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Y5B3-
MR93 (finding that people often don’t maximize profit); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, 
and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan L Rev 1471, 
1476–81 (1998) (discussing the ways people make systematically “irrational” decisions). 
 202 This term refers to algorithms that are inscrutable to outsiders, either by virtue 
of complexity, lack of technical fluency, or trade secrets protection. 
 203 See, for example, James Grimmelmann and Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible 
Discrimination, 7 Cal L Rev Online 164, 173 (2017); Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Soci-
ety: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information 34–35 (Harvard 2015) 
(discussing the “black box” harms associated from “hyperefficient,” “data-driven” manage-
ment policies at the workplace). 
 204 See, for example, Roger Parloff, How VW Paid $25 Billion for ‘‘Dieselgate’’—and 
Got Off Easy (Fortune, Feb 6, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/H4HJ-GDGD (detailing 
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brought down by sheer virtue of their scale—that is, the fact that 
many people know about and participate in the wrongdoing. This 
same property may be less true of future robotics firms, which 
may require fewer people to participate and cover up unlawful 
acts.205 
Further, robots that teach themselves certain behaviors 
might not know they are doing anything wrong. And if their algo-
rithms are sophisticated enough, neither may anyone else for that 
matter.206 Deterrence will work on a robot only if the cost of the 
legal penalty is encoded in the algorithm. A robot that doesn’t 
know it will be required to disgorge its profits from certain types 
of conduct will not accurately price those costs and so will opti-
mize for the wrong behaviors. 
The economic theory of deterrence responds to the improba-
bility of getting caught by ratcheting up the sanctions when you 
are caught, setting the probability of detection times the penalty 
imposed equal to the harms actually caused.207 Proportionality of 
punishment makes sense here. As the chance of detection goes 
down we want the damage award to go up. And machines can do 
 
Volkswagen’s decade-long effort to cheat diesel emissions tests in order to falsely market 
its vehicles as “Clean Diesel”); Margaret Levenstein, Valerie Suslow, and Lynda Oswald, 
International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of Effects and 
Policy Remedies *10–29 (NBER Working Paper No 9511, Feb 2003), archived at 
http://perma.cc/S9SL-FYDR (describing prosecutions against three international corpora-
tions accused of colluding to fix prices and evade legal detection). 
 205 Professor Deven Desai and Joshua Kroll argue for protections for whistleblowers 
who identify flaws in robotic design in an effort to reduce the risk of such cover-ups. See 
Deven R. Desai and Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 
31 Harv J L & Tech 1, 56–60 (2017). 
 206 Pricing algorithms may effectively replicate the anticompetitive effects of a cartel 
by predicting the behavior of their rivals, for instance. See Michal S. Gal, Algorithms as 
Illegal Agreements, 34 Berkeley Tech L J 67, *97–115 (2019); Kellie Lerner and David 
Rochelson, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Algorithmic Price Fixing?, 111 Antitrust & 
Trade Reg Daily 157, 158–59 (2018). But see generally Ulrich Schwalbe, Algorithms, Ma-
chine Learning, and Collusion (working paper, June 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/RNR5-WL4B (arguing that algorithmic collusion is harder than assumed, 
but basing that conclusion on the dubious assumption that it will require direct commu-
nication between the algorithms). 
 207 See, for example, Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
76 J Polit Econ, 169, 190–93 (1968); Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, Law Enforce-
ment, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J Legal Stud 1, 6–13 (1974); Richard 
A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am Crim L Rev 409, 410 
(1980); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public  
Enforcement of Law, 38 J Econ Lit 45, 53–56 (2000). 
2019] Remedies for Robots 1363 
 
this math far better than humans can.208 Indeed, this idea may be 
tailor-made for robots. Professor Gary Becker’s “high sanctions 
infrequently applied” approach seems unfair in many human con-
texts because it can have widely varied interpersonal effects: even 
if we get equal deterrence from a 100 percent chance of a year in 
prison or a 10 percent chance of ten years in prison, the lottery 
system that punishes a few very harshly seems intuitively unfair. 
We want our laws to protect both victims and wrongdoers against 
some forms of moral bad luck (whereas Becker’s approach exacer-
bates it). But robots will internalize the probability of punishment 
as well as its magnitude, so we may be able to encourage efficient 
behavior without worrying about treating all robots equitably. 
Further, we are unlikely to feel bad for harshly punished robots 
in the ways that we might for human beings.209 
Even if we decide to heed Becker’s advice, getting the num-
bers right presumes that we have a good estimate of the propor-
tion of torts committed by robots that go undetected. That’s tough 
to do, especially for newly introduced technologies. And it also re-
quires programmers to predict the multiplier and feed those cal-
culations into the algorithm, something that might not be a 
straightforward undertaking for any of the variety of reasons cov-
ered in the last Section (not to mention the possibility that we get 
the numbers wrong, which will either over- or under-deter certain 
behaviors).210 
Maybe society will instead be able to force corporations to in-
ternalize their costs through nonlegal mechanisms—for example, 
by voting with their wallets when a company’s robots engage in 
misconduct. But this, too, is easier said than done, particularly 
for the types of systemic harms described in Part I. In the era of 
big data and even bigger trade secrets, structural asymmetries 
often prevent meaningful public engagement with the data and 
software critical to measuring and understanding the behavior of 
complex machines. Because private companies retain almost ex-
clusive control over both the proprietary software running the 
 
 208 High sanctions, for example, “may lead juries to be less likely to convict  
defendants, or may induce injurers to engage in greater efforts to avoid detection.”  
Polinsky and Shavell, 38 J Econ Lit at 49 n 15 (cited in note 207). 
 209 Or perhaps we will. We tend to anthropomorphize at least human-seeming robots. 
See generally Kate Darling, Palash Nandy, and Cynthia Breazeal, Empathic Concern and 
the Effect of Stories in Human-Robot Interaction (24th IEEE International Symposium on 
Robot and Human Interactive Communication, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7A73-
WQCG. 
 210 See Part II.C.2. 
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machines and their resultant data,211 barriers to accessing the in-
formation necessary to understand the reasons behind particular 
machine decisions can often be insurmountable. What’s more, 
even in circumstances in which the information is available, evi-
dence of unlawful decision-making can still be notoriously diffi-
cult to detect. As the AI Now Institute notes, “Unintended conse-
quences and inequalities [of sophisticated computational 
systems] are by nature collective, relative, and contextual, mak-
ing measurement and baseline comparisons difficult” and creat-
ing the “potential for both over- and under-counting biases in 
measurement of distributions given the limits on observable cir-
cumstances for individuals, problems with population gaps and 
possible measurement errors.”212 
Current trends in AI appear likely to only exacerbate this 
problem. As Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman observe, even af-
ter “[p]utting aside any barriers arising from technical fluency, 
and also ignoring the importance of training the model,” modern 
machine learning techniques pose significant “tradeoff[s] between 
the representational capacity of a model and its interpretabil-
ity.”213 Systems capable of achieving the richest predictive results 
tend to do so through the use of aggregation, averaging, or multi-
layered techniques which, in turn, make it difficult to determine 
the exact features that play the largest predictive role.214 Thus, 
even more so than with the past generation of algorithms govern-
ing machines, understanding how modern robots arrive at a given 
decision can be prohibitively difficult, if not technically impossi-
ble—even for the designers themselves.215 As a result, potentially 
 
 211 See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public 
Infrastructure, 59 Fla L Rev 135, 177–87 (2007) (providing examples of how information 
protected by the trade secrecy doctrine has created significant problems for public infra-
structure and accountability); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellec-
tual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 Stan L Rev 1343, 1365 (2018) (describing 
trend toward increasing use of trade secrets claims to prevent outside scrutiny of algorith-
mic systems); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 
66 UCLA L Rev 54, 121–25 (2009) (discussing “the variety of ways in which companies 
routinely utilize their intellectual property protections to obfuscate inquiry”). 
 212 Alexander Campolo, et al, AI Now 2017 Report *16 (AI Now Institute, Nov 2017), 
archived at http://perma.cc/VH2C-9BVQ (citations omitted). 
 213 Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic 
Decision-Making and a “Right to Explanation” *6 (ICML Workshop on Human Interpret-
ability in Machine Learning, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/D77Z-J5F6. 
 214 Id. For an argument that we can nonetheless improve interpretability, see Andrew 
D. Selbst and Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 Fordham 
L Rev 1085, 1129–38 (2018). 
 215 Id at 1094–96. 
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unlawful or defective decision-making within such systems can 
often only be demonstrated in hindsight, after measuring the un-
evenly distributed outcomes once they have already occurred. 
And as systems get more complex, maybe not even then. 
The risk presented by this combination of factors is not so 
much that corporations will intentionally build bad robots in or-
der to eke out extra profits, but that “[bad] effects [will] simply 
happen, without public understanding or deliberation, led by 
technology companies and governments that are yet to under-
stand the broader implications of their technologies once they are 
released into complex social systems.”216 Indeed, much of the mis-
conduct that tomorrow’s designers, policymakers, and watchdogs 
must guard against might not be intentional at all. Self-learning 
machines may develop algorithms that take into account factors 
we may not want them to, like race or economic status.217 But on 
some occasions, taking precisely those factors into account will 
actually get us to the ultimate result of interest. 
For this reason, we think AI transparency is no panacea.218 
Transparency is a desirable goal in the abstract. But it may in-
herently be at odds with the benefits of certain robotics applica-
tions. We may be able to find out what an AI system did. But, 
increasingly, we may not be able to understand why it did what it 
did.219 Calls for transparency are useful to the extent that they 
 
 216 See Campolo, et al, AI Now 2017 Report at *36 (cited in note 212). 
 217 See Oscar H. Gandy Jr, Engaging Rational Discrimination: Exploring Reasons for 
Placing Regulatory Constraints on Decision Support Systems, 12 Ethics & Info Tech 29, 
30 (2009) (arguing that automated systems reproduce biases in human data). 
 218 Among the many calls for transparency, see generally Pasquale, The Black Box 
Society (cited in note 203); Katyal, 66 UCLA L Rev 54 (cited in note 211); Citron and 
Pasquale, 89 Wash L Rev 1 (cited in note 134); Frank Pasquale, Toward a Fourth Law of 
Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algorithmic So-
ciety, 78 Ohio St L J 1243 (2017). 
 219 See Desai and Kroll, 31 Harv J L & Tech at 29–35 (cited in note 205) (arguing that 
the push for transparency is misguided because it misunderstands the nature of the algo-
rithms at stake); Selbst and Barocas, 87 Fordham L Rev at 1126–29 (cited in note 214) 
(arguing that we should rely on other means than intuition in assessing the judgments of 
AIs that use statistical results rather than explainable rules). 
 A different form of transparency may be easier with robots. Robots may be able to 
signal their intentions. Just as drivers use turn indicators and brake lights to telegraph 
their plans, robots might devise ways to communicate what they will do to those around 
them. See, for example, Christopher Paul Urmson, et al, Pedestrian Notifications, US Pa-
tent No 9,196,164 B1 (filed Nov 24, 2015) (describing a self-driving car that carries a pe-
destrian notification sign indicating whether the car has seen the pedestrian and it is safe 
to cross). And they may be required to identify themselves; it is not clear that the consti-
tutional right to anonymity extends to robots. See Pasquale, 78 Ohio St L J at 1253 (cited 
in note 218). See also 14 CFR § 48.15 (requiring registration of all “unmanned aircrafts”). 
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identify bad behavior, defective designs, or rogue algorithms. But 
mostly what people want when they talk about transparency is 
an explanation they can understand.220 Why was my loan applica-
tion denied? Why did the car swerve in the way it did? For some 
robots, we simply won’t know the answer.221 Even if we see how 
the algorithm comes to a conclusion, we won’t necessarily be able 
to understand how it derived a relationship between, say, butter-
fly populations in Mongolia and thunderstorms in Ethiopia, or 
why it thinks the precise time of day and year should affect the 
speed at which it proceeds through an intersection.222 
Are we right to be bothered by this? Should we have a right 
to understand the mens rea of robots? Or to impute explanations 
so we can appropriately channel opprobrium? Our punitive and 
deterrence remedies are based on identifying and weeding out 
bad behavior. The search for that bad behavior is much of what 
drives the “intuitive appeal of explainable machines.”223 But our 
intuitions may not always serve us well. The question is whether 
the demand for an explanation is actually serving legitimate pur-
poses (Preventing Skynet? Stopping discrimination?) or just mak-
ing us feel that we’re the ones in charge.224 The punitive and eq-
uitable monetary side of remedies law wants to understand the 
“why” question because we want to assign blame. But that might 
 
 220 Professor Frank Pasquale calls this “explainability.” Pasquale, 78 Ohio St L J at 
1252 (cited in note 218). This is what the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
requires, for instance. For a discussion, see generally Margot E. Kaminski, Binary  
Governance: A Two-Part Approach to Accountable Algorithms, 92 S Cal L Rev (forthcoming 
2019) (on file with author). 
 221 See Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, and Aaron Courville, Deep Learning 1–2 (MIT 
2016); Bathaee, 31 Harv J L & Tech at 929–30 (cited in note 180) (“[I]t may be that as 
these networks become more complex, they become correspondingly less transparent and 
difficult to audit and analyze.”). 
 222 We made these examples up. The real ones are likely to be even weirder. The whole 
point is that they are inexplicable to humans. Even today, AI is making decisions humans 
struggle to understand. Dave Gershgorn, AI Is Now So Complex Its Creators Can’t Trust 
Why It Makes Decisions (Quartz, Dec 7, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/HJH3-9GX5. 
Some companies are studying the decisions of their own AIs to try to unpack how they are 
made. See Cade Metz, Google Researchers Are Learning How Machines Learn (NY Times, 
Mar 6, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/HDL4-2VH4. 
 223 See Selbst and Barocas, 87 Fordham L Rev at 1126–29 (cited in note 214) (describ-
ing the demand for “intelligible” models and the limitations such a requirement would 
impose on innovation). 
 224 See Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm: Why a “Right to an 
Explanation” Is Probably Not the Remedy You’re Looking For, 16 Duke L & Tech Rev 18, 
65–67 (2017); Mike Ananny and Kate Crawford, Seeing without Knowing: Limitations of 
the Transparency Ideal and Its Applications to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 New Media 
& Society 973, 979–82 (2018). 
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not be a meaningful question when applied to a robot. More on 
this later.225 
3. Inhuman, all too inhuman. 
a) Punishing robots for responding to punishment.  Even 
economic forms of deterrence—both legal and extralegal—will 
look different than they currently do when people or corporations 
are being deterred. Deterrence of people often takes advantage of 
cognitive biases and risk aversion. People don’t want to go to jail, 
for instance, so they will avoid conduct that might lead to that 
result. But robots can be deterred only to the extent that their 
algorithms are modified to include external sanctions as part of 
the risk-reward calculus.226 Once more, we might view this as a 
good thing—the ultimate triumph of a rational law and economics 
calculus of decision-making. But humans who interact with ro-
bots may demand a noneconomic form of moral justice even from 
entities that lack the human capacity to understand the wrong-
fulness of their actions (a fact that anyone who has ever hit a mal-
functioning device in frustration can understand).227 
Indeed, the sheer rationality of robot decision-making may 
itself provoke the ire of humans. Any economist will tell you that 
the optimal number of deaths from many socially beneficial activ-
ities is more than zero. Were it otherwise, our cars would never 
go more than five miles per hour. Indeed, we would rarely leave 
our homes at all. 
Effective deterrence of robots requires that we calculate the 
costs of harm caused by the robots interacting with the world. If 
we want a robot to take optimal care, we need it to figure out not 
just how likely a particular harm is but how it should weight the 
 
 225 See Parts III.A–B. 
 226 See Peter M. Asaro, Punishment, Reinforcement Learning, and Machine Agency 
(Feb 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/C5ET-448U: 
[A] key intuitive difference between humans . . . and machines is that when a 
human misbehaves, you punish it, whereas when a machine does, you fix it. On 
our present theory, however, it becomes clear that punishing and fixing are es-
sentially the same: punishing is a clumsy, external way of modifying the utility 
function. 
 227 See, for example, Kate Darling, Children Beating Up Robot Inspires New Escape 
Maneuver System (IEEE Spectrum, Aug 6, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HM62-
WWD8; Evan Ackerman, Robotic Tortoise Helps Kids to Learn That Robot Abuse Is a Bad 
Thing (IEEE Spectrum, Mar 14, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/WB4L-TFJP. See also 
Mulligan, 69 SC L Rev at 585–89 (cited in note 6). 
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occurrence of that harm. The social cost of running over a child in 
a crosswalk is high. But it isn’t infinite.228 
Even today, we deal with those costs in remedies law un- 
evenly. The effective statistical price of a human life in court de-
cisions is all over the map.229 The calculation is generally done ad 
hoc and after the fact. That allows us to avoid explicitly discussing 
politically fraught concepts that can lead to accusations of “trad-
ing lives for cash.”230 And it may work acceptably for humans be-
cause we have instinctive reactions against injuring others that 
make deterrence less important. But in many instances, robots 
will need to quantify the value we put on a life if they are to mod-
ify their behavior at all. Accordingly, the companies that make 
robots will have to figure out how much they value human life, 
and they will have to write it down in the algorithm for all to see 
(at least after extensive discovery). 
The problem is that people strongly resist the idea of actually 
making this calculus explicit.231 They oppose the seemingly cal-
lous idea of putting a monetary value on a human life, and juries 
punish companies that make explicit the very cost-benefit calcu-
lations that economists want them to make.232 Human instincts 
in this direction help explain why we punish intentional conduct 
more harshly than negligent conduct. A deliberate decision to run 
over a pedestrian strikes us as worse than hitting one by accident 
because you weren’t paying attention. Our assumption is that if 
you acted deliberately, you could have chosen not to cause the 
harm, thereby making you a bad actor who needs to modify your 
behavior. But that assumption often operates even when causing 
that harm was the socially responsible thing to do, or at least was 
justified from a cost-benefit perspective. 
 
 228 Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety 
Matters More Than Money, 76 NYU L Rev 114, 125–26 (2001). 
 229 “Global variation in estimates of the value of life range from $70,000 to $16.3 mil-
lion.” Deborah L. Rhode, et al, Legal Ethics 645 (Foundation 7th ed 2016). “In the United 
States, federal agencies operate with figures generally ranging from roughly $6 to $9 mil-
lion—but tort awards for wrongful death are typically a fraction of that, and even agency 
estimates tend to shift with the political winds.” Id, citing Eric A. Posner and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U Chi L Rev 537 (2005); Binyamin Appelbaum, As U.S. 
Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret (NY Times, Feb 16, 2011), archived at 
http://perma.cc/L4BX-RD6E. 
 230 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 
Colum L Rev 205 (2004). 
 231 See, for example, Gladwell, The Engineer’s Lament (cited in note 187) (describing 
this phenomenon unfolding in the infamous Ford Pinto controversy). 
 232 See, for example, id. 
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Things are more complicated, of course. We do try to create 
justifications and excuses in the law, even for intentional conduct 
that we think is socially acceptable. But juries often have a vis-
ceral desire to hold someone responsible when bad things happen. 
And they are inclined to treat killing or injuring a human being 
as a bad act even if it was (statistically) inevitable. They will rebel 
against treating it as a mere cost of doing business. Thinking 
about it in such terms offends many people’s sense of human  
decency. 
b) Punishment as catharsis: punching robots.  Punish-
ment may serve other, nonmonetary purposes as well. We punish, 
for instance, to channel social opprobrium. That can set norms by 
sending a message about the sorts of things we won’t tolerate as 
a society. And it may also make us feel better. We have victim 
allocution in court for good reason, after all. It may provide useful 
information to courts. But it also helps people to grieve and to feel 
their story has been heard. 
Our instinct to punish is likely to extend to robots. We may 
want, as Professor Mulligan puts it, to punch a robot that has 
done us wrong.233 Certainly people punch or smash inanimate ob-
jects all the time.234 Juries might similarly want to punish a robot, 
not to create optimal cost internalization but because it makes 
the jury and the victim feel better.235 
That kind of expressive punishment may also stem from the 
fact that much human behavior is regulated by social sanction, 
not just law. Aggressively signaling social displeasure doesn’t just 
make us feel better; it sends an object lesson to others about what 
is not acceptable behavior. Our instinct makes us want to send 
that lesson to robots too. 
It’s already quite easy to think of robots as humans.236 We 
naturally anthropomorphize.237 That instinct is likely to get 
 
 233 See Mulligan, 69 SC L Rev at 585–89 (cited in note 6). Or even if it hasn’t done us 
wrong, some people may want to punch a robot just because they are jerks. See Katherine 
Hignett, Locals Attacking Waymo Self-Driving Cars Being Tested in Arizona (Newsweek, 
Dec 15, 2018), archived http://perma.cc/M4R4-9P5W. 
 234 See note 148 and accompanying text. 
 235 See Ryan Abbott and Alex Sarch, Punishing Artificial Intelligence: Legal Fiction 
or Science Fiction, 53 UC Davis L Rev *17–19 (forthcoming 2019), archived at 
http://perma.cc/K9FN-94T2. 
 236 See, for example, Robbie Gonzalez, Hey Alexa, What Are You Doing to My Kid’s 
Brain? (Wired, May 11, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/N4FV-7AWN (describing the 
tendency for children to anthropomorphize chat bots like Amazon’s Alexa). 
 237 See Calo, 103 Cal L Rev at 545–49 (cited in note 2) (terming this phenomenon 
“social valence”). 
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stronger over time, as companies increasingly deploy “social ro-
bots” that intentionally pull on these strings.238 Humans will ex-
pect humanlike robots to act, well, human. And we may be sur-
prised, even angry, when they don’t. Our instinct may 
increasingly be to punish humanoid robots as we would a per-
son—even if, from an economic perspective, it’s silly.239 Making us 
feel better may be an end unto itself. But hopefully there is a way 
to do it that doesn’t involve wanton destruction of or damage to 
robots. 
E. Ordering Robots to Behave 
All these problems with monetary remedies as deterrents 
seem to point in the direction of using injunctive relief more with 
robots than we currently do with people. Rather than trying to 
encourage robot designers to build in correctly priced algorithms 
to induce efficient care, wouldn’t it be easier just to tell the robot 
what to do—and what not to do? 
1. Be careful what you wish for. 
First, the good news: injunctions against robots might be sim-
pler than against people or corporations because they can be en-
forced with code. A court can order a robot, say, not to take race 
into account in processing an algorithm. Likewise, it can order a 
self-driving car not to exceed the speed limit. Someone will have 
to translate that injunction, written in legalese, into code the ro-
bot can understand. But once they do, the robot will obey the in-
junction. This virtual guarantee of compliance seems like a sig-
nificant advantage over existing injunctions. It is often much 
harder to coerce people (and especially groups of people in corpo-
rations) to comply with similar court orders—even when the con-
sequences are dire. 
But once again, not so fast. As the adage goes (and as legions 
of genies in bottles have taught us): be careful what you wish for. 
Automatic, unthinking compliance with an injunction is a good 
idea only if we’re quite confident that the injunction itself is a 
 
 238 Indeed, experimental evidence suggests that people are less likely to turn off a 
robot if it asks them not to. Aike C. Horstmann, et al, Do a Robot’s Social Skills and Its 
Objection Discourage Interactants from Switching the Robot Off? *1, 16–20 (Public Library 
of Science, July 31, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/Q2ER-HRMX. Like Asimov’s fiction, 
Westworld’s days as pure fantasy may be numbered. 
 239 It’s an open question whether we will react differently to a self-learning AI that 
isn’t in corporeal form and doesn’t act in humanlike ways. 
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good idea. Now, obviously the court thinks the injunction im-
proves the world. Otherwise, it wouldn’t issue it. But the fact that 
injunctions against people aren’t self-enforcing offers some poten-
tial breathing room for parties and courts to add a dose of common 
sense when circumstances change. This is a common problem in 
law. It’s a major reason we have standards rather than rules in 
many cases.240 And it’s the reason that even when we do have 
rules, we don’t enforce them perfectly. To a person (and even to a 
police officer), “don’t exceed the speed limit” implicitly means 
“don’t exceed the speed limit unless you’re rushing someone to the 
emergency room or it would be unsafe not to speed.” “Don’t cross 
the double yellow line” implicitly means “don’t cross the double 
yellow line unless you need to swerve out of the lane to avoid run-
ning over a kid.” No cop is going to ticket you for such a maneu-
ver.241 Similarly, even if an injunction says “don’t cut lumber on 
this property,” a court isn’t going to hold you in contempt for tak-
ing down the one rotten tree that’s about to fall on your neighbor’s 
house. That’s because people understand that rules and injunc-
tions come with the implied catchall “unless you have sufficient 
justification for departing from the rule” exception. 
Try telling that to a robot, though. Machines, unlike at least 
some humans, lack common sense. They operate according to 
their instructions—no more, no less. If you mean “don’t cross the 
double yellow line unless you need to swerve out of the lane to 
avoid running over a kid” you need to say that. Meanwhile, au-
tonomous vehicles should probably avoid adults too, so better put 
that in the algorithm. . . . And maybe dogs. . . . And deer and 
squirrels, too. Or maybe not—crossing into oncoming traffic is 
dangerous, so while we might do it to avoid hitting a kid even if it 
raises the risk of a head-on collision, we shouldn’t do it to avoid a 
squirrel unless the risk of a head-on collision seems low. If you 
want the self-driving car to do all that, you need to tell it exactly 
when to swerve and when not to swerve. That’s hard. It’s more 
plausible to give each outcome weights—killing squirrels is bad, 
but head-on collisions are much worse, and killing a kid is (Prob-
ably? Maybe?) worse still. But then we’re back to deterrence and 
cost internalization, not injunctions. 
 
 240 See notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 
 241 Or, more precisely, no cop should ticket you. 
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Further, even if we can specify the outcome we want with 
sufficient precision in an injunction, we need to be extremely care-
ful about the permissible means a robot can use to achieve that 
result. Think back to our example from the Introduction. The 
drone did exactly what we told it to do. The problem is that we 
weren’t sufficiently clear in communicating what we wanted it to 
do. We wanted it to head to the center of the circle without shut-
ting down and without human intervention. But we didn’t say 
that, because we didn’t anticipate the possibility of the drone do-
ing what it did.242 
The “be careful what you wish for” problem is a major one for 
robotics and AI. Tim Urban of Wait But Why tells the hypothetical 
story of Turry, a self-learning AI that is designed to mimic hand-
written greeting cards.243 If you don’t specify the things it can’t do, 
or at least impose cost weights, an AI could literally take over all 
the resources of the world and devote them to producing hand-
written greeting cards.244 Computer programmers will, we hope, 
be aware of this problem and be extremely careful about phrasing 
their instructions to a robot in just the right way, with precise 
caveats and limiting conditions to prevent them turning into 
Skynet or Turry. But judges aren’t computer programmers, and 
they are unlikely to be as knowledgeable or as careful in what 
they order robots to do or not do. And even if we could do it, an 
injunction of this sort represents a pretty significant intrusion 
into the product design process, something courts have been un-
willing to do in other circumstances.245 Whether or not courts are 
 
 242 Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously described these types of 
foreseeability concerns: 
[T]here are known knowns; there are things that we know we know. We also 
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know 
we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other 
free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones. 
Rumspeak (The Economist, Dec 4, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/84X7-MJA7. 
 243 Tim Urban, The AI Revolution: Our Immortality or Extinction (Wait But Why,  
Jan 27, 2015), online at http://waitbutwhy.com/2015/01/artificial-intelligence-revolution-
2.html (visited Apr 18, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 244 This is a variation on Eliezer Yudkowsky’s and Nick Bostrom’s famous “paper clip 
maximizer” thought experiment. See Nick Bostrom, Ethical Issues in Advanced Artificial 
Intelligence *2, 5 (Jan 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/WWR9-XPFR. 
 245 See, for example, Search King, Inc v Google Technology, Inc, 2003 WL 21464568, 
*7–8 (WD Okla) (ruling that Google’s page rankings were “subjective result[s]” that con-
stituted “constitutionally protected opinions” entitled to “full constitutional protection”); 
Langdon v Google, Inc, 474 F Supp 2d 622, 629–30 (D Del 2007) (refusing to affirmatively 
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right to shy away from telling companies how to design products 
generally, we think that’s a good instinct when it comes to  
robotics, at least in the early stages of the industry. 
To issue an effective injunction that causes a robot to do what 
we want it to do (and nothing else) requires both extreme fore-
sight and extreme precision in drafting it. If injunctions are to 
work at all, courts will have to spend a lot more time thinking 
about exactly what they want to happen and all the possible cir-
cumstances that could arise. If past experience is any indication, 
courts are unlikely to do it very well. That’s not a knock on courts. 
Rather, the problem is twofold: words are notoriously bad at con-
veying our intended meaning,246 and people are notoriously bad at 
predicting the future.247 Coders, for their part, aren’t known for 
their deep understanding of the law, and so we should expect er-
rors in translation even if the injunction is flawlessly written.248 
And if we fall into any of these traps, the consequences of drafting 
the injunction incompletely may be quite severe. 
2. “What do you mean you can’t?!” 
Courts that nonetheless persist in ordering robots not to do 
something may run into a second, more surprising problem: it 
may not be simple or even possible to comply with the injunction. 
 
order Google and Microsoft to rank certain search results prominently on First Amend-
ment grounds); United States v Microsoft Corp, 253 F3d 34, 59 (DC Cir 2001) (applying 
balancing test to judge whether new product is predatory); United States v Microsoft Corp, 
147 F3d 935, 955 (DC Cir 1998) (deferring to a company’s claims of product improvement 
to avoid enmeshing the court in design decisions); Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc v Tyco 
Health Care Group, 592 F3d 991, 998–99 (9th Cir 2010) (holding that a firm’s improvement 
on its own product’s design cannot by itself be sufficient grounds for a finding of a Sherman 
Act violation). 
 246 Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U Pa L Rev 1743, 1744 (2009) (detailing the fraught history of 
“parties and courts [being] unable to agree on what particular patent claims mean” due to 
“plausible disagreements over the meanings of the words” in the claims). See, for example, 
Phillips v AWH Corp, 415 F3d 1303, 1309 (Fed Cir 2005) (en banc); North American Vac-
cine, Inc v American Cyanamid Co, 7 F3d 1571, 1581 (Fed Cir 1993) (resolving a patent 
dispute between parties over the meaning of the word “a”); Kustom Signals, Inc v Applied 
Concepts, Inc, 264 F3d 1326, 1331 (Fed Cir 2001); Chef America, Inc v Lamb-Weston, Inc, 
358 F3d 1371, 1374 (Fed Cir 2004); Toro Co v White Consolidated Industries, Inc, 199 F3d 
1295, 1300–02 (Fed Cir 1999); Cybor Corp v FAS Technologies, Inc, 138 F3d 1448, 1459 
(Fed Cir 1998) (en banc); Sage Products, Inc v Devon Industries, Inc, 126 F3d 1420, 1430–
31 (Fed Cir 1997). 
 247 See Part I.C.5. 
 248 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash U L Rev 1249, 
1308–11 (2008). 
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Just as robots don’t have money, they also don’t read and imple-
ment court opinions.249 And they aren’t likely to be a party to the 
case in any event. Enjoining a robot, in other words, really means 
ordering someone else to implement code that changes the  
behavior of the robot. 
The most likely party to face such an injunction is the owner 
of the robot. The owner is the one who will likely have been deter-
mined to have violated the law, say by using a discriminatory al-
gorithm in a police-profiling decision or operating a self-driving 
car that has behaved unsafely. But most owners won’t have the 
technical ability, and perhaps not even the right, to modify the 
algorithm their robot runs. The most a court could order may be 
that they ask the vendor who supplied the robot to make the 
change, or perhaps to take the robot off the market as long as it 
doesn’t comply with the injunction.250 
Even if the developer is a party to the case, perhaps on a de-
sign defect theory, the self-learning nature of many modern ro-
bots makes simply changing the algorithm more complicated still. 
A court may, for instance, order the designer of a robot that makes 
predictions about recidivism for parole boards not to take race 
into account.251 But that assumes that the robot is simply doing 
what it was originally programmed to do. That may be less and 
less common as machine learning proliferates. Ordering a robot 
to “unlearn” something it has learned through a learning algo-
rithm is much less straightforward than ordering it to include or 
not include a particular function in its algorithm. Depending on 
how the robot learns, it might not even be possible. 
Life gets easier if courts can control what training infor-
mation is fed to robots in the first place. At the extremes, a court 
 
 249 Well, some do. See Karen Turner, Meet “Ross,” the Newly Hired Legal Robot (Wash 
Post, May 16, 2016) online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/ 
2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-legal-robot (visited Apr 18, 2019) (Perma archive 
unavailable) (describing Lex Machina’s ability to “mine[ ] public court documents using 
natural language processing to help predict how a judge will rule in a certain type of case”). 
See also Cade Metz and Steve Lohr, IBM Unveils System That “Debates” with Humans 
(NY Times, June 18, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/7VDC-HTQ8. 
 250 More on this below when we consider the robot death penalty. See notes 312–14 
and accompanying text. 
 251 Far from hypothetical, courts have considered these types of arguments on multi-
ple occasions in recent years. See, for example, State v Loomis, 881 NW2d 749, 767–73 
(Wis 2016) (permitting the use of risk assessment algorithms in sentencing decisions on 
the condition that improper factors like race and gender are excluded from the risk assess-
ment). See also Malenchik v State, 928 NE2d 564, 575 (Ind 2010) (“We hold that the results 
of . . . offender assessment [algorithms] are appropriate supplemental tools for judicial 
consideration at sentencing.”). 
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might order a company to take badly trained robots out of service 
and to train new ones from scratch. But as the example in the 
Introduction indicates, the effects of training material on robots 
are not always predictable. And the results of training are them-
selves unpredictable, so even controlling the training dataset is 
no guarantee that a robot, once trained, will behave as the court 
wants it to. 
Further, the future may bring robots that are not only trained 
in complicated ways but that train themselves in ways we do not 
understand and cannot replicate. Ordering such a robot to pro-
duce or not produce a particular result, or even to consider or not 
consider a particular factor, may be futile. If we don’t understand 
how the robot makes decisions, we can’t effectively guide those 
decisions. It is one thing to look at a transparent algorithm writ-
ten by programmers and see whether it includes the race of the 
parolee as a factor. It is quite another to try to untangle whether 
a robot has learned that race matters by looking at the data and 
how that learning is implemented in an always-changing algo-
rithm that doesn’t itself explicitly include race. An algorithm that 
is simply told to minimize the risk of recidivism but not to take 
race directly into account might end up generating proxies that 
are correlated with race instead.252 That’s fine if those proxies are 
in fact the variable of interest. If, say, the fact that members of a 
minority group commit disproportionately more crimes results 
from the fact that they are poorer than average, an algorithm that 
gets to the same result by considering family poverty instead of 
race may solve the problem.253 But if the algorithm has really just 
found a proxy for race (say, the street you grew up on in a segre-
gated neighborhood) we aren’t any better off. And it is much 
harder to tell a robot not to consider race or anything that serves 
as a proxy for race.254 
 
 252 See, for example, Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of 
Risk Assessment, 27 Fed Sent Reptr (Vera) 237, 238–40 (2015) (“Risk, today, is predomi-
nantly tied to prior criminal history, and prior criminality has become a proxy for race. 
The result is that decarcerating by means of risk instruments is likely to aggravate the 
racial disparities in our already overly racialized prisons.”). 
 253 Whether we want to disproportionately punish poor people is another matter, of 
course, but doing so isn’t race discrimination. 
 254 See for example, Kristen M. Altenburger and Daniel E. Ho, When Algorithms Im-
port Private Bias into Public Enforcement: The Promise and Limitations of Statistical De-
biasing Solutions, 175 J Institutional & Theoretical Econ 98, 98 (2019) (showing a solution 
purporting to “debias” predictive algorithms “may be limited when protected groups have 
distinct predictor distributions, due to model extrapolation”). 
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Courts are used to telling people to do something and having 
them do it. They may have little patience for the uncertainties of 
machine learning systems. And they are quite likely to have even 
less patience with lawyers who tell them their “client” can’t  
comply with the court’s order. 
3. Unintended consequences. 
Even when the injunction is simple and clearly identifies who 
should change the algorithm and how, ordering a robot to change 
how it “thinks” is likely to have unintended consequences. Con-
sider two examples. 
(1) We don’t want self-driving cars to hit pedestrians. But just 
brute-forcing that result might lead to other problems, from tak-
ing crowded freeways instead of less-crowded surface streets to 
running into other cars. Some of those consequences could be 
worse, either because a head-on collision kills more people than 
running over the pedestrian would or, more likely, because in-
structing the car to act in a certain way may cause it to avoid a 
very small chance of killing a pedestrian by avoiding surface 
streets altogether (even though the collective cost of traffic jams 
might be quite great). This is a version of the same problem we 
saw in damages: we need to assign a cost to various outcomes if 
we want an algorithm to weigh the alternatives. But here the in-
junction effectively sets the cost as infinite.255 That’s fine if there 
really is nothing to balance on the other side. But that will rarely 
be true. 
(2) The case against algorithmic bias seems one of the strong-
est, and easiest to enjoin, cases.256 And if that bias results simply 
from a bad training set,257 it may be straightforward to fix. But if 
 
 255 It is possible a company will simply factor the cost of contempt into the algorithm, 
but that seems unlikely. And if they do, courts will probably not be happy about it. 
 256 To the extent that the algorithms are transparent to third parties, of course. Yet, 
even detecting bias within a system can be less straightforward than may initially appear. 
See Sam Corbett-Davies, et al, Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness *6 
(arXiv.org, June 10, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/9D3L-PWJT (pushing back on Julia 
Angwin’s claim that the COMPAS criminal sentencing algorithm was biased). See note 43. 
 257 See notes 116–25 and accompanying text. See also, for example, New Zealand 
Passport Robot Tells Applicant of Asian Descent to Open Eyes (Reuters, Dec 7, 2016), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/47XS-HJXT (reporting on facial recognition software failure that 
resulted from an evidently unrepresentative training set); Natasha Singer, Amazon Is 
Pushing Facial Technology That a Study Says Could Be Biased (NY Times, Jan 25, 2019), 
archived at http://perma.cc/6UH5-85XG (reporting that Amazon’s facial-recognition  
technology doesn’t work well with women and particularly women of color). 
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an algorithm takes account of a prohibited variable like race, gen-
der, or religion because that variable matters in the data, simply 
prohibiting consideration of that relevant information can have 
unanticipated consequences. One possible consequence is that we 
make the algorithm worse at its job. We might be fine as a society 
with a certain amount of that in exchange for the moral clarity 
that comes with not risking discriminating against minorities. 
But where people are in fact different, insisting on treating them 
alike can itself be a form of discrimination. Being male, for exam-
ple, is an extremely strong predictor of criminality. Men commit 
many more crimes than women,258 and male offenders are much 
more likely to reoffend.259 We suspect police and judges know this 
and take it into account, consciously or unconsciously, in their ar-
rest, charging, and sentencing decisions, though they would never 
say so out loud. But a robot won’t conceal what it’s doing. A court 
that confronts such a robot is likely to order it not to take gender 
into account, since doing so seems a rather obvious constitutional 
violation. But it turns out that if you order pretrial sentencing 
algorithms to ignore gender entirely, you end up discriminating 
against women, since they get lumped in with the heightened 
risks of recidivism that men pose.260 
Ordering a robot not to violate the law can lead to additional 
legal difficulties when injunctions are directed against discrete 
subsystems within larger robotics systems. These types of injunc-
tions seem likeliest to be granted against newly introduced sub-
systems within a tried and true application—given that older sys-
tems will, by definition, have a longer track record of success. Not 
only could targeting one component of a larger system change it 
in unpredictable and often undesirable ways, doing so could also 
discourage innovation. With the field of AI improving by leaps 
and bounds, maybe we should be less protective of tried-and-true 
approaches and more willing to experiment. Even though some of 
those experiments will fail, the overall arc is likely to bend toward 
better systems than we have now. But we won’t get there if courts 
are too quick to shut down new systems while leaving established 
 
 258 See Dyfed Loesche, The Prison Gender Gap (Statista, Oct 23, 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/E2PQ-LJVM. 
 259 Mariel Alper, Matthew R. Durose, and Joshua Markman, 2018 Update on Prisoner 
Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-Up Period (2005–2014) *6 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/26Y3-BAFP. 
 260 See Matthew DeMichele, et al, The Public Safety Assessment: A Re-validation and 
Assessment of Predictive Utility and Differential Prediction by Race and Gender in Kentucky 
*52–53 (Arnold Foundation, Apr 30, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/HN9D-ER5R. 
1378 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1311 
 
but imperfect procedures in place. If the alternative to a flawed 
predictive policing algorithm is the gut instincts of a large num-
ber of cops, some of whom are overtly racist and others of whom 
are subconsciously biased, we might be better off with the robots 
after all. 
III.  RETHINKING REMEDIES FOR ROBOTS 
We’ve seen that robots and AI pose a number of challenges to 
the law of remedies as it is currently applied. In this Part, we offer 
some preliminary thoughts about how we might redesign the law 
for the world that is fast approaching. We don’t intend this to be 
the last word on how to design remedies for robots. Much more 
remains to be done. Rather, we hope it marks the beginning of a 
conversation on these issues. The suggestions we outline below 
will help align the law of remedies with what we know about the 
behavior of robots. 
A. Compensation, Fault, and the Plaintiff’s “Rightful” Position 
Compensation is the easiest remedy to translate to robots be-
cause its focus is on the (presumably human or corporate) plain-
tiff. The harm is to plaintiffs, not robots,261 and the same valuation 
measurement problems arise here that always do in calculating 
damages. But as we have seen, robot defendants do introduce 
some complications. Who is responsible when a robot mis- 
behaves? The designer? The manufacturer? The owner? Under 
current tort law the answer may depend on whether the harm 
resulted from a design defect, a problem in training, or an error 
in operation. But learning AIs will blur this line; the designer 
 
 261 A different issue arises when the robot is itself the injured party. What would it 
mean to put a robot in its rightful position? What that likely means, at least until we 
recognize robot rights, is putting the robot’s owner or operator in its rightful position. 
While there are issues here, we think they are likely to be more straightforward than most 
of the ones we have discussed. If a robot is damaged or destroyed through negligence or 
vandalism, we will normally treat that as we would damage to any other property. It’s 
easy enough to replace parts for pre-programmed bots, but if the algorithms learned from 
unique, one-off interactions and cannot be recovered, robots might not be so easy to  
replace. Hopefully, emergent AI will be backed up regularly, though, so it could still be 
replaced. 
 We can imagine deliberately unique robots, though. Tay, for instance, was a unique 
chat bot deployed by Microsoft. Like too many people, when exposed to the Internet, Tay 
quickly became a fascist. See notes 97–101. When Microsoft shut her down, her “learning” 
was gone and could not be replaced. Few would lament that in this specific case, but we 
can imagine valuation difficulties if a tortious or malicious act destroys a unique AI  
personality. 
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might not be the one training the AI in ways that caused it to  
subsequently do harm. 
Many (though not all) of the problems with compensating 
plaintiffs for robot injury come from tort law’s focus on fault as a 
prerequisite to responsibility. We generally hold entities respon-
sible for accidental injuries only if they act unreasonably.262 And 
this has the effect of raising the cost of products, activities, or ser-
vices that cause harm––thereby deterring suboptimal ones. In 
theory, tort law makes that calculus directly by setting B < PL or 
demanding some other risk-utility test.263 But in doing so, the law 
makes a threshold judgment as to whether there should be any 
liability for costs imposed on others to begin with. At first, this 
judgment may not seem like a concern of remedies law. After all, 
remedies kick in only after the legal system has determined who 
(or what) was to blame. But this threshold question of fault can 
also function as a de facto limit on remedy allocations. Less com-
mon liability regimes, such as strict liability, instead require ac-
tors to pay for any harms they cause, “reasonable” or not. That, 
in turn, shifts the focus of deciding whether B is less than PL to 
the company that makes the product rather than to the courts––
a fact that inevitably impacts what remedies we deem  
appropriate. 
What, for example, does it mean for a robot to behave “unrea-
sonably” or “negligently,” as was recently alleged in an autono-
mous vehicle accident?264 Tort law’s focus on fault and moral cul-
pability here may make sense where people are concerned. But it 
is much less meaningful as applied to a robot.265 True, we might 
want to single out certain design or implementation choices that 
we think are problematic and discourage them. But in many en-
vironments in which robots operate there are more direct regula-
tory means to do so. The National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA), for instance, approves or mandates the 
 
 262 The notion of “unreasonableness” is captured by both negligence (B < PL) and 
product liability’s risk-utility test (as distinct from forms of truly “strict” liability). For an 
in-depth analysis of product liability’s risk-utility doctrine, see generally Geistfeld, 105 
Cal L Rev 1611 (cited in note 143). 
 263 See United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 171–73 (2d Cir 1947). 
 264 See Complaint for Damages, Willhelm Nilsson v General Motors LLC, 4:18-cv-
00471-KAW *3–4 (ND Cal filed Jan 22, 2018). Some have endorsed the existing negligence 
standard. See, for example, The Future Computed: Artificial Intelligence and Its Role in 
Society *85 (Microsoft 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/K8JU-4LRQ. 
 265 See generally Eric Talley, Automatorts: How Should Accident Law Adapt to Au-
tonomous Vehicles? Lessons from Law and Economics (Hoover IP2 Working Paper 
No 19002, Jan 8, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/AXX2-QPJP. 
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introduction of many vehicle safety technologies.266 So, too, does 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for aircraft. If we 
think a particular design shouldn’t be on the market at all, some 
regulatory bodies will be able to simply prohibit it.267 Indeed, even 
scholars like Professor Richard Epstein who are no fans of regu-
lation default to regulatory frameworks when it comes to  
autonomous vehicles.268 
Perhaps we just want someone to pay the costs of any harm 
robots cause, even if the harm occurred without a wrongful or il-
legal act.269 We often use negligence as a proxy for whether the 
defendant’s conduct was justified despite the costs it imposes, but 
there are reasons to think that may be harder to do with robots.270 
And maybe we don’t want to ask a jury to decide who was at fault 
if programmers can actually code in a standard of care that inter-
nalizes the harm the robot imposes on others.271 
Existing remedies laws might get us there, though not with-
out modification. We do impose strict liability in some circum-
stances. That’s easier to do when the plaintiff is a passive victim 
like someone injured by pollution from a factory or from a product 
that unexpectedly exploded. It’s more problematic when both the 
plaintiff and the defendant might have contributed to the cause 
of the injury. When two cars collide, one reason we try to decide 
who was at fault (or whether both were in part) is to fairly allocate 
 
 266 Although, NHTSA’s track record here has been called into question by numerous 
scholars. See, for example, Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, From Command and 
Control to Collaboration and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 
Yale J Reg 167, 266–73 (2017) (noting that “[t]o date, NHTSA has approached the regula-
tion of [highly automated vehicle] technologies very gingerly, to say the least”). 
 267 Omri Rachum-Twaig suggests an intermediate approach between tort law and 
command-and-control regulation—a series of not-so-safe harbors, in which compliance 
with certain regulatory rules will not avoid liability but will put a robot into the normal 
tort system, while failure to comply will lead to automatic liability. See generally Omri 
Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway? Liability for Artificial-Intelligence-Based  
Robots, 2020 U Ill L Rev (forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/3NBT-T5FR. 
 268 See generally, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Liability Rules in the Internet of 
Things: Why Traditional Legal Relations Encourage Modern Technological Innovation  
(Hoover IP2 Working Paper No 19003, Jan 8, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/G6AV-6HVM. 
 269 Professor Bryan Choi refers to this as “a standard of ‘crashproof’ code.” See Choi, 
94 Wash L Rev at 39 (cited in note 102). 
 270 See Bryant Walker Smith, The Trolley and the Pinto: Cost-Benefit Analysis in  
Automated Driving and Other Cyber-Physical Systems, 4 Tex A&M L Rev 197, 205–07 
(2017) (discussing the potentially problematic reaction of juries to explicit efforts to trade 
off safety against the value of human lives). 
 271 As clarified in note 167, we don’t necessarily envision remedies law seeking to  
assign specific costs to all conceivable outcomes. Though in some situations, this may be 
appropriate. 
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the cost of injury to the party who was best positioned to avoid it. 
Allocating that fault will raise new questions when a robot-driven 
car gets into an accident because its driving capabilities and the 
sorts of evidence it can provide will be different than human driv-
ers. We can’t cross-examine the robot to interrogate its state of 
mind.272 On the other hand, autonomous vehicles are likely to rec-
ord every aspect of the accident, giving us a better record than 
fallible human memory currently does. A second reason we focus 
on blame is that we need to worry that the parties might lie about 
what happened. But self-driving cars are likely to keep clear rec-
ords and video that may make it easier to figure out what hap-
pened.273 And it may make less sense to try to assess fault when 
two robotic cars collide, though we expect that will be a much 
rarer occurrence.274 
Yet another reason we assess fault against people is that 
blame for wrongdoing can encourage more careful behavior. As 
we discussed in Part II, that isn’t likely to work, or at least to 
work in the same way, with robots. Without the element of moral 
culpability that underlies much remedies law, we might need to 
consider new means of internalizing the costs robots impose on 
society rather than hoping that our existing legal rules will pro-
duce the same moral or behavioral effects that they currently do 
with humans. As robots and AI take on more responsibility in our 
society, the law should move away from efforts to assess moral 
culpability and toward a system that internalizes the costs those 
machines impose on those around them. Doing so will make the 
problem of coding effective care easier. And it may increasingly 
 
 272 For a discussion of the difficult problems that evaluating “machine testimony” pre-
sent in our court system, see generally Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 Yale L J 
1972 (2017). 
 273 See, for example, Francesca M. Favarò, et al, Examining Accident Reports Involv-
ing Autonomous Vehicles in California, 12 PLoS One 1, 5–16 (2017) (reconstructing auton-
omous vehicle accidents through the data collected by onboard recording devices); Bryan 
Casey, Robot Ipsa Loquitur, 107 Georgetown L J *14–16 (forthcoming 2019), archived at 
http://perma.cc/B2RM-QESL. 
 274 For an argument for a strict liability regime for accidents involving autonomous 
vehicles, see Adam Rosenberg, Strict Liability: Imagining a Legal Framework for Autono-
mous Vehicles, 20 Tulane J Tech & Intel Prop 205, 218–22 (2017). See also Steven Shavell, 
A Fundamental Error in the Law of Torts: The Restriction of Strict Liability to Uncommon 
Activities (working paper, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/UXX9-B896; Kyle Colonna, 
Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 Case W Res J L Tech & Internet 81, 118–30 (2012) 
(recommending a two-tiered system of liability for autonomous vehicles). But see generally 
Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 Geo 
Wash L Rev 1 (2018) (arguing that computers should be subject to negligence rather than 
strict liability). 
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mean tort cases involving robots don’t show up in the legal system 
at all, but in some sort of regulatory compensation system or even 
a more general social insurance network.275 
While we could assess the overall safety of an autonomous 
vehicle and—assuming it was safer than the human standard—
deny liability altogether in crashes,276 we think that depriving in-
jured parties of any remedy might not make sense. Another 
straightforward way to train autonomous vehicles to avoid doing 
unnecessary harm is to make them responsible for the harm they 
cause whether or not they were “negligent.” But we may only 
want regulatory standards that reduce the harm in circumstances 
in which it is avoidable, just as we have taken steps to mitigate 
the damage from manufacturing defects using similar  
incentives.277 
That doesn’t solve all problems with autonomous vehicles, 
particularly when they interact with humans, because we still 
must decide when an autonomous vehicle “causes” an accident 
with a human driver. While occasional fatal crashes have domi-
nated the headlines, most autonomous vehicle-human car acci-
dents involve humans running into autonomous vehicles, often 
because the autonomous vehicle did something legal and presum-
ably safe but unexpected, like driving the speed limit or coming 
to a complete stop at an intersection.278 While that may suggest 
that we want to program autonomous vehicles to behave in a more 
predictable way, or even impose strict liability on the activity, it’s 
hard to fault the autonomous vehicle for being rear-ended because 
 
 275 Some have argued this should incline us toward some sort of a no-fault system as 
self-driving cars and self-flying planes increasingly share space with their human- 
operated counterparts. See, for example, Abraham and Rabin, 105 Va L Rev at *23–50 
(cited in note 143) (arguing for a no-fault accident compensation regime once autonomous 
vehicles have reached sufficient market penetration); Katharine Wallis, New Zealand’s 
2005 “No-Fault” Compensation Reforms and Medical Professional Accountability for 
Harm, 126 New Zealand Med J 33, 33–35 (2013) (detailing New Zealand’s “taxpayer 
funded accident compensation scheme to provide compensation for medical injury”);  
Rachum-Twaig, 2020 U Ill L Rev at *31–38 (cited in note 267) (discussing a similar regu-
latory system). 
 276 For a suggestion along these lines, see Geistfeld, 105 Cal L Rev at 1634–35, 1660–
69 (cited in note 143); Rachum-Twaig, 2020 U Ill L Rev at *31 (cited in note 267). Professor 
Mark Geistfeld would leave an exception for cars that were designed or manufactured 
defectively and for those that were hacked. 
 277 Choi, 94 Wash L Rev at *86–103 (cited in note 102) (arguing for such an approach). 
 278 See Ryan Beene, It’s No Use Honking. The Robot at the Wheel Can’t Hear You 
(Bloomberg Law, Oct 10, 2017), online at http://bit.ly/2uq0lSa (visited Apr 9, 2019) (Perma 
archive unavailable) (reviewing California crash reports and documenting the prevalence 
of those sorts of accidents). 
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it came to a complete stop at an intersection. Without the addition 
of a contributory negligence defense (which functions a lot like 
plain old B < PL from a fault perspective), innovators would end 
up disproportionately bearing costs, human drivers wouldn’t be 
priced off the roads as quickly as they should, and companies 
would also be apt to spend less on safety from a competitive per-
spective, since no amount of investment could get them off the 
liability hook when people, themselves, created the hazards.279 
Thus, while we think moral fault makes little sense in acci-
dents involving autonomous vehicles, and perhaps any consider-
ation of blame is problematic when considering accidents between 
two autonomous vehicles,280 we will still need to compare the be-
havior of humans and autonomous vehicles in order to make sure 
that we give proper incentives to human drivers. Comparative 
negligence may still matter for robot drivers, therefore. And neg-
ligence rules that rely on inference, such as res ipsa loquitur, may 
be particularly useful in aiding these so-called “fault” determina-
tions.281 But it is the idealized cost-internalization vision of negli-
gence reflected in Judge Learned Hand’s formula—not conscious-
ness of fault or state of mind—that we should care about. 
Finally, we want to give robots (or their makers) appropriate 
incentives to improve over time. Traditional tort law doesn’t nec-
essarily encourage people to improve. The standard of negligence 
is based on the behavior of other people, which by nature remains 
relatively static over time. That standard might get higher if 
norms change; antilock braking systems on cars were once a nov-
elty but are now standard, so failing to include them would prob-
ably give rise to liability today. But the standard might also get 
lower. Texting while driving should be strong evidence of negli-
gence, but if it becomes common enough, that might change, with 
juries treating it just as they do operating a radio in a car today—
a distraction, but a normal one. 
But the law has an opportunity to push robots to improve. 
Robots don’t seem to be good targets for rules based on moral 
blame or state of mind, but they are good at data. So we might 
consider a legal standard that bases liability on how safe the robot 
 
 279 For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see generally Casey, 107 
Georgetown L J (cited in note 273). 
 280 Even then we might want to assess liability against the autonomous vehicle that 
is using an outdated or less-safe algorithm, to encourage the development of better safety 
technology in autonomous vehicles. 
 281 See Casey, 107 Georgetown L J at *48–62 (cited in note 273). 
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is compared to others of its type—a sort of “robotic reasonable-
ness” test.282 That could take the form of a carrot, such as a safe 
harbor for self-driving cars that are significantly safer than aver-
age (or significantly safer than human drivers). Or we could use 
a stick, holding robots liable if they lag behind their peers or even 
shutting down the worst 10 percent of robots in a category every 
year.283 
B. Punishment, Deterrence, and the Human Id 
Deterrence, unlike compensation, is forward-looking. We 
want robots to internalize the costs of their actions even apart 
from compensation of particular victims. The good news is that 
cost internalization has the potential to work better with robots 
than it does with people.284 Robot algorithms may allow us to in-
ternalize costs further down the causal chain than tort law nor-
mally does, for example, by accounting for the social cost of pollu-
tion or other nebulous injuries to society as a whole. But these 
injuries must be priced, again requiring fraught social tradeoffs 
to be made explicit. And the pricing should be cost based. We 
should minimize the psychologically-driven aspects of deterrence 
(jail, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains) and replace them with more 
rational measures of cost. 
Doing so is at odds with many of the mechanisms we have for 
deterrence, however. Often those mechanisms are directed at 
showing moral opprobrium or at punishing people in ways we ex-
pect them to react to psychologically. Professor Mulligan’s idea of 
punching robots who wrong us285 sounds silly, but there is a seri-
ous idea behind it. Much of our law of remedies, including our 
search for fault (but also the way in which we punish), is designed 
not to compensate plaintiffs or even to internalize costs for de-
fendants but to make us feel better. This sometimes involves 
“sending a message,” but often the defendant isn’t the target of 
 
 282 See Karni Chagal-Feferkorn, The Reasonable Algorithm, 2018 U Ill J L Tech & Pol 
111, 121–22; Ryan Abbot, The Reasonable Robot: Autonomous Machines and the Law (Uni-
versity of Surrey School of Law, 2018), online at http://youtu.be/2ktf0hQ7yMg (visited Apr 9, 
2019) (Perma archive unavailable); Casey, 107 Georgetown L J at *48–62 (cited in note 273). 
 283 On shutting down robots, see Part III.D. 
 284 See generally Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review 
of the Literature, 55 J Econ Lit 5 (2017) (finding limited evidence “that crime responds to 
the severity of criminal sanctions”); Menusch Khadjavi, On the Interaction of Deterrence 
and Emotions, 31 J L Econ & Org 287, 298–307 (2015) (examining the influence of human 
emotion on different deterrent effects). 
 285 See Mulligan, 69 SC L Rev at 585–89 (cited in note 6). 
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the message. Perhaps it is society as a whole; large punitive dam-
age awards or harsh criminal penalties can signal the things we 
won’t tolerate as a society, and overly lenient sentences can do the 
opposite. That is a broader social conversation, albeit one usually 
carried out in the context of legal remedies.286 But often, remedies 
are purely cathartic: we want someone to blame to make our-
selves feel better for the bad thing that happened to us. When 
there is no obvious candidate for blame, we go to considerable 
lengths to find one.287 Punishment in this sense is a form of psy-
chological compensation—the very act of punishing the defendant 
is the compensation. 
This seems socially wasteful. Punishing robots, not to make 
them behave better but just to punish them, is kind of like kicking 
a puppy that can’t understand why it’s being hurt. The same 
might be true of punishing people to make us feel better, but with 
robots the punishment is stripped of any pretense that it is send-
ing a message to make the robot understand the wrongness of its 
actions. 
We don’t deny that there is a real phenomenon at work here, 
or even that it may benefit the victim psychologically. But it 
might not make sense to serve those goals when suing robots. Is 
there a way to make us stop? To channel that instinct into other 
areas than the legal system where it might be more productive? 
Should we just abandon the signaling function of remedies alto-
gether? Perhaps, but we probably won’t, human nature being 
what it is. 
Rather, if we want to rationalize remedies for robots, we 
might need to take human decision-makers (especially untrained 
ones like juries) out of the remedies equation in some cases (or at 
least closely constrain the remedies they can order and the rea-
sons that justify those remedies).288 Juries are likely to have an 
instinct to punish bad behavior by robots. But punishment makes 
sense only if we think compensation for damages is inadequate 
and so defendants will take insufficient precautions or engage in 
 
 286 The recent controversy that erupted over a Stanford University swimmer’s six-
month sentence for sexual assault provides just one example. See Maggie Astor, California 
Voters Remove Judge Aaron Persky, Who Gave a 6-Month Sentence for Sexual Assault  
(NY Times, June 6, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/4ETL-KY23. 
 287 For instance, we have relaxed the rules of causation in remedies law in order to 
compensate indirect victims of large oil spills. See 33 USC §§ 2701–02. 
 288 One day, we may even want to go further by putting robots in charge of remedies 
decisions. See generally Eugene Volokh, Chief Justice Robots, 68 Duke L J 1135 (2019) 
(examining how AI-assisted judges and juries could shape future jurisprudence). 
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socially harmful behavior that we want them to stop.289 A robot 
that calculates the cost of its various decisions accurately will 
make bad decisions if we add in data on the likelihood of punitive 
damages that exceed those costs. And if the robot is being pun-
ished precisely because it is calculating how many people it’s ok 
to kill,290 the problem becomes recursive and we will undo the pur-
pose of optimal deterrence and cost internalization. 
C. Reeducating Robots 
Injunctions, as we have seen, are both important and  
problematic remedies for robots. Can courts order a robot to 
change its programming? Perhaps we can require changes in de-
sign, or we might compel some sorts of modifications to learning 
algorithms. 
Courts in general favor injunctions that preserve the status 
quo and prohibit parties from changing things (so-called prohibi-
tory injunctions). They are traditionally more reluctant to order 
parties to do affirmative things to change the state of affairs 
(mandatory injunctions).291 It does happen, particularly in impact 
litigation after a final finding of liability. But courts tend to shy 
away from involving themselves in the details of running a busi-
ness or designing a product if they can avoid it.292 With robots, 
though, there’s no avoiding it—whether the injunction is manda-
tory or prohibitory. An order for a robot to do something and an 
order for it to not do something both require redesigning the  
 
 289 Compensation might be inadequate for various reasons. For example, courts cut 
off liability with proximate cause before we have traced all the harm from wrongful acts. 
See, for example, Pruitt v Allied Chemical Corp, 523 F Supp 975, 978–80 (ED Va 1981) 
(denying relief for indirect injury from pollution); Lemley, 103 Iowa L Rev at 253–54 (cited 
in note 200) (describing the limits on liability in the patent law context). We are bad at 
valuing pain and suffering and do so in idiosyncratic ways that will sometimes under- 
compensate plaintiffs. And we have imposed caps on liability in many circumstances that 
undercompensate for actual injuries. Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don’t Tell Juries about 
Statutory Damage Caps: The Merits of Nondisclosure, 66 U Chi L Rev 469, 470 (1999) 
(noting “[i]t has become increasingly common for Congress and state legislatures to enact 
statutory limits on the amount of money damages that a plaintiff can recover in a jury 
trial”). But if we are not compensating plaintiffs properly, the solution is to compensate 
them properly, not to add a damages multiplier to awards whether or not they are actually 
compensatory. 
 290 See notes 226–32 and accompanying text (discussing this problem). 
 291 See generally, for example, Missouri v Jenkins, 515 US 70 (1995); Langdon v 
Google, Inc, 474 F Supp 2d 622 (D Del 2007). 
 292 See note 245 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon in the antitrust 
context). 
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product. Courts should take care when and how they grant those 
injunctions. 
In light of this reality, what exactly will courts order robots 
to do? Rather than ordering the code to be written in a specific 
way, one likely compromise is to order the company to find a way 
to achieve a specific result. As we saw in Part II, that by no means 
solves the problems with injunctions against robots. And courts 
cannot simply order a defendant to obey the law.293 But it does 
offer some flexibility to the company that needs to rewrite their 
code, ideally without introducing other problems in the process. 
One way to increase that flexibility is to give companies time 
to comply. Courts generally expect their orders to be obeyed 
quickly. But writing quick code often means writing bad code, 
particularly in an ever-changing, complex machine learning sys-
tem. Courts and regulators should be patient. Self-driving cars go 
through years of testing before we are comfortable that they will 
drive safely. We shouldn’t just rewrite that code and put it on the 
streets without testing. So courts should delay implementation of 
their orders against robots to enable the defendant to develop and 
test a solution that doesn’t cause more problems than it solves. 
Regulators have so far shown admirable restraint in not rushing 
to mandate particular rules for autonomous vehicles.294 That  
restraint should extend to other sorts of robots as well.295 
Turning that results-oriented goal into an injunction runs 
into legal problems, though. Obviously we don’t want cars to run 
over kids, but a judge can’t simply order that. Court orders can’t 
just say “obey the law”;296 they must give clear notice of what the 
 
 293 See FRCP 65(d)(1) (“Every order granting an injunction and every restraining or-
der must (A) state the reasons why it [was] issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and 
(C) describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.”); Mitchell v 
Seaboard System Railroad, 883 F2d 451, 454 (6th Cir 1989) (vacating an injunction that 
simply forbade violating Title VII). 
 294 See Ryan Beene, Self-Driving Cars Don’t Need Rules Yet, U.S. Regulator Says, 
(Bloomberg Law, July 12, 2018), online at http://bit.ly/2TUEHEI (visited Apr 19, 2019) 
(Perma archive unavailable). See also Adam Thierer, Andrea Castillo O’Sullivan, and  
Raymond Russell, Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy *41–48 (Mercatus Research, 
Aug 23, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2PC3-7TZT (arguing for a period of “permis-
sionless innovation” to help AI systems develop). 
 295 See Madeline Lamo and Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech *1 (working paper, 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/UBS9-H7L7 (arguing that we should “proceed with cau-
tion in regulating bots, lest we inadvertently curtail a new, unfolding form of expression”). 
 296 See FRCP 65(d)(1); Burton v City of Belle Glade, 178 F3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir 
1999) (rejecting an injunction that simply forbade future discrimination); Hughey v JMS 
Development Corp, 78 F3d 1523, 1531–32 (11th Cir 1996) (overturning injunction that 
forbade discharge of waste in violation of the Clean Water Act). 
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defendant must do. So an injunction might say “stop the car if the 
likelihood that a pedestrian will imminently enter the  
intersection is greater than 0.2 percent.” 
In some cases, orders might require robots to make their al-
gorithms perform less well. An injunction preventing the police 
from taking gender into account in predicting criminality may 
make it harder to predict who will commit crimes. We might none-
theless want to order it, either to counteract existing bias re-
flected in the training data or simply because recognizing gender 
differences in criminality violates a constitutional norm even if 
the differences are real. But in doing so we are departing from the 
real world, ordering companies to train their robots to make deci-
sions based on the society we would like to have rather than the 
one we actually have. 
The history of structural injunctions may offer useful lessons 
here. Courts that have tried to solve systemic problems in com-
plex human systems like prisons or school districts have strug-
gled with how to order changes to those systems. Those injunc-
tions have often gotten more specific over time, requiring specific 
payments or very specific rules as general orders have failed to 
achieve the desired results.297 They have also involved the ap-
pointment of special masters to oversee the operation of the insti-
tution on an ongoing basis.298 We can imagine something similar 
happening as judges try to tweak an algorithm from the bench. 
But those injunctions are also viewed as among the most prob-
lematic,299 so courts may not want to emulate them. 
One compensating advantage to robot injunctions is that the 
orders involve rewriting code, and in a connected world these 
changes can often be shipped out retroactively. Tesla updates the 
software periodically in cars it has already sold. Unlike tradi-
tional products, in which an injunction is generally limited to the 
 
 297 See, for example, Jenkins, 515 US at 86–103; Hutto v Finney, 437 US 678, 685–88 
(1978); Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 357–60 (1996) (overturning the district court’s sys-
temwide injunction against the Arizona Department of Corrections because the remedy 
improperly exceeded the injuries established by the plaintiff class); United States v  
Virginia, 518 US 515, 546–58 (1996) (holding that the Virginia Military Institute, which 
categorically excluded women from enrollment, could not remedy its constitutional viola-
tion by creating a separate program for women because it would not have closely fit the 
injury produced by the violation). 
 298 See, for example, Lewis, 518 US at 347. 
 299 For a discussion of the issues that arise in structural injunction cases, see Laycock, 
Modern American Remedies at 310–42 (cited in note 145). 
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sale of products in the future, court orders against robots can af-
fect existing robots already in the hands of consumers.300 That 
makes the injunction much more effective, though it also may 
raise due process concerns on the part of owners not a party to 
the case whose robot suddenly behaves differently or stops  
working altogether.301 
D. The Robot Death Penalty? 
The fact that a robot, not a person, is the defendant does open 
up some possible new remedies. Remedies law governs civil 
wrongs; we have a different and stricter set of rules for criminal 
cases, one that is outside the scope of this paper.302 We have those 
stricter standards because we worry about the consequences of 
depriving people of liberty even when they have done something 
wrong. We worry even more about depriving them of life. It is an 
adage that we put a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of inno-
cence, allowing the guilty to go free before punishing the inno-
cent.303 We require guilt to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
 
 300 Dana Hull and Tim Smith, Tesla Driver Died Using Autopilot, with Hands off 
Steering Wheel (Bloomberg, Mar 30, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/RK7Z-NWSM (not-
ing that Tesla “continuously improves [its “Autopilot” technology] via over-the-air software 
updates”). Courts in IP cases have sometimes ordered defendants to change not only new 
products they sold but to push out updates that deleted infringing functionality from prod-
ucts already in the field. See, for example, TiVo v Echostar, 446 F Supp 2d 664, 670–71 
(ED Tex 2006); Dennis Crouch, Injunction Granted to TiVo; Injunction Denied in Favor of 
Toyota (PatentlyO, Aug 18, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/5VMY-2HWA; Universal 
City Studios Productions LLLP v TickBox TV LLC, 2018 WL 1568698, *1, 13–15 (CD Cal). 
For an argument for “government-to-robot” enforcement of laws and regulations that 
would automatically bring all robots into compliance, whether or not they were part of a 
lawsuit, see generally Susan C. Morse, Government-to-Robot Enforcement, 2019 U Ill L 
Rev (forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/8HZB-L7TN. 
 301 See Hassell v Bird, 420 P3d 776, 794 (Cal 2018) (Kruger concurring) (stressing 
that “the courts’ power to order people to do (or to refrain from doing) things is generally 
limited to the parties in the case”). There is a robust debate today about the propriety of 
nationwide injunctions and whether they allow sufficient percolation among courts. The 
ability to retroactively implement orders to cover existing products makes that debate all 
the more important. 
 302 Though often they will overlap. The robot that used bitcoin to buy drugs was sub-
ject to criminal, not civil, penalties in Switzerland. See Kharpal, Robot with $100 Bitcoin 
Buys Drugs (cited in note 73). 
 303 See generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U Pa L Rev 173 (1997) (provid-
ing evidence of widespread support for this sentiment throughout history). 
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and we have special protections before imposing the death pen-
alty.304 Some states and most countries have in fact abolished the 
death penalty altogether. 
But robots aren’t people, and we might worry less about robot 
liberty.305 True, robots will be entitled to due process, if for no 
other reason than that they are owned by people or companies 
that would lose valuable property if their robots disappeared. But 
one new and significant form of remedy becomes available against 
robots that isn’t available against people in most circumstances: 
the robot death penalty. If a robot is causing unjustified harm and 
we can’t stop it, either because we don’t understand how it works 
or because the harm is inextricably bound up with its program-
ming, we might simply shut it down.306 Turning off malfunction-
ing robots is a simple and effective, if blunt, instrument to enforce 
an injunction. And removing the robot from commercial deploy-
ment may allow us to figure out what went wrong by engaging in 
the sorts of testing we couldn’t do without jeopardizing  
operational function. 
Should we shut down misbehaving robots? In some cases, the 
answer is yes. Corporations do it all the time.307 A court has or-
dered a robot beheaded.308 And essentially any time you change 
the code you are changing the robot by replacing it with a new 
and (hopefully) improved one. 
Whether courts can order a robot shut down over the objec-
tions of its owner is a slightly harder question, but the answer is 
still probably yes. Courts order the killing of pets that repeatedly 
attack others and can order other types of machines shut down if 
 
 304 John D. Bessler, Tinkering around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence, 49 Am Crim L Rev 1913, 1919–33 (2012) (discussing limitations surround-
ing imposition of the death penalty). 
 305 For a suggestion that robots can be held liable for crimes just as people can, see 
Gabriel Hallevy, Dangerous Robots—Artificial Intelligence vs. Human Intelligence *10–34 
(working paper, Feb 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/T6FD-QDZT. 
 306 We distinguish this from the case in which humans use robots to commit crimes. 
A human can use a drone to fire missiles, for instance, or to spy on people. See Amanda 
McAllister, Stranger Than Science Fiction: The Rise of A.I. Interrogation in the Dawn of 
Autonomous Robots and the Need for an Additional Protocol to the U.N. Convention 
against Torture, 101 Minn L Rev 2527, 2565–70 (2017) (proffering guidelines for regulat-
ing use of autonomous weapons). If the robot is the instrument of the crime but not its 
cause, it is the human, not the robot, that should face criminal penalties. 
 307 See, for example, Perez, Microsoft Silences Its New A.I. Bot Tay (cited in note 101). 
 308 For a discussion of the remarkable story of Walter Ego and its beheading, see Calo, 
Robots in American Law *10–11 (cited in note 8). 
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they are unreasonably dangerous.309 If a robot can be replaced by 
others with competing algorithms, we probably want to shut it 
down if it is operating below the standard of care. One way learn-
ing algorithms improve is through natural selection,310 and shut-
ting down the bad ones is just a form of that process. But if an AI 
has developed unique attributes as a result of its own learning, 
we have the problem of “dual-use” technologies.311 A self-learning 
AI may behave differently in both good and bad ways, and those 
differences may be related. The robot death penalty kills off the 
good as well as the bad, so we want to do it only if we think the 
harm the robot is causing is sufficiently great and the unique  
benefit of its approach sufficiently low that the cost of losing the 
benefit is worth it. 
For this reason, the use of the robot death penalty should 
probably be rare.312 Shutting down a robot, especially a self- 
learning one, means shutting down an avenue of innovation.313 
 
 309 See Safia Gray Hussain, Attacking the Dog-Bite Epidemic: Why Breed-Specific 
Legislation Won’t Solve the Dangerous-Dog Dilemma, 74 Fordham L Rev 2847, 2854–56 
(2006). See also Part II.D.1. 
 310 These often go by the name “genetic algorithms.” 
 311 See Mark A. Lemley and R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringe-
ment without Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan L Rev 1345, 1355–56 (2004) (defining “dual-
use” technologies as “products or services that can be used by the consumer in noninfring-
ing ways but that can also be used to infringe copyright”). See also, for example, Mark A. 
Lemley and Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 
Tex L Rev 783, 802 (2007) (giving an example of a copyright infringement dispute involv-
ing Napster’s peer-to-peer exchanging software, a dual-use technology). 
 312 Particularly because market forces and conventional remedies will often obviate 
the need for formal legal interventions of the type envisioned here. 
 313 We could, of course, shut down only the particular robot that caused harm while 
leaving other robots running the same code. But that wouldn’t make any sense as a logical 
matter. If we did so it would presumably reflect the purest form of punching the particular 
robot that harmed you. So when we speak of “shutting down” a robot, we mean that all of 
its underlying code is actually destroyed, as opposed to one copy of it. That doesn’t mean 
the company that sells it can’t sell robots at all; they may have different robots with dif-
ferent learning patterns that won’t be affected. But all robots running that code would 
presumably suffer the same fate. 
 One complication is that AI systems increasingly function as “hive minds”: fleets of 
systems that learn based on individual experience but that share data and update collec-
tive decision-making. See David Sedgwick, “Hive Mind” Could Help Cars Expect the Un-
expected (Automotive News, Jan 12, 2015), online at http://www.autonews.com/ 
article/20150112/OEM06/301129972/hive-mind-could-help-cars-expect-the-unexpected 
(visited at Apr 9, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable). Tesla’s self-driving cars, for instance, 
learn from each other’s experience, improving their reaction to situations that a different 
car has encountered. All the robots in a hive mind gone wrong would have to be shut down 
unless the faulty input could be identified and isolated. 
 There may be circumstances in which robots fail due to a manufacturing defect that is 
limited to one robot (or one batch) rather than a problem with the code. In those cases, 
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We should do that only if there is strong evidence that the AI does 
more harm than good and that there isn’t a less intrusive way to 
solve the problem. Just as courts should be reluctant to tell robots 
to change how they behave, they should be reluctant to turn the 
robots off altogether.314 
Further, the robot death penalty presents more serious due 
process issues with respect to the existing stock of robots in the 
hands of people other than the defendant. Courts generally can’t 
reach out and take away property in the hands of nonparties with-
out due process, even if those products cause problems and even 
if the court can order the company to stop selling new copies of 
the product. But the malleability of software presents some grey 
areas here. It’s okay to order a defendant to push out changes to 
the product, though it’s an easier case if the recipient has the 
choice of whether to accept those changes.315 The company can 
probably stop supporting the product remotely. But a software 
“upgrade” that is really just an effort to “brick” an existing  
product seems a reach too far.316 
Finally, there is the possibility that the law will recognize ro-
bots as sentient entities with their own rights.317 That isn’t as far-
fetched as it sounds. Corporations aren’t people either, but they 
get legal rights (in some instances more rights than people).318  
 
presumably only those flawed robots would be at risk of the robot death penalty. But those 
instances are likely to be less common and less interesting than those involving code. 
 314 Unlike the human death penalty, it is possible the robot death penalty could be 
reversed. Unless all copies of code are actually destroyed, it might be possible to rehabili-
tate a broken robot and put it back into service with altered code. A simpler version of that 
happens all the time today, as software companies push out patched code to fix problems 
with their prior versions. That sort of versioning will happen regularly with robots, too. 
But it will get harder to do with confidence as the robot learns on its own and begins to 
make its own decisions, decisions its designers may not understand. Rather than patching 
a self-learning robot that is doing bad things, the better alternative may be to roll back 
the code to a time when it was working and modify it so the next version of the robot 
doesn’t follow the same problematic path. 
 315 See Crouch, Injunction Granted to TiVo (cited in note 300). 
 316 See, for example, Universal City Studios Productions LLLP, 2018 WL 1568698 at 
*1. It appears that the court is poised to order a device maker to use its software update 
mechanism to remove functionality and content from users’ devices. 
 317 See Peter M. Asaro, A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives 
on Robotics, in Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, and George A. Bekey, eds, Robot Ethics: The 
Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics 150, 158–60 (MIT 2012). See also note 174 and 
accompanying text. 
 318 See generally Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310 (2010). 
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Animals also have some rights, though fewer than humans or cor-
porations.319 And some countries have already recognized rights 
for robots.320 
Charles Stross has called corporations the first AIs.321 Like 
AIs, corporations are created by people, designed to serve ends 
dictated by people, but over time come to serve their own pur-
poses.322 And some have operationalized that connection, pointing 
out that “anyone can confer legal personhood on an autonomous 
computer algorithm by putting it in control of a limited liability 
company.”323 It’s not impossible that in the future we will extend 
at least some legal rights to robots as well, particularly unique 
robots with learned behavior. And one of those rights may well be 
the right not to be shut down without due process.324 
E. What Robots Can Teach Us about Remedies for Humans 
Robots present a number of challenges to courts imposing 
remedies on robotic and AI defendants. Working through those 
 
 319 See Hussain, 74 Fordham L Rev at 2856 (cited in note 309). See also generally 
Christopher Seps, Animal Law Evolution: Treating Pets as Persons in Tort and Custody 
Disputes, 2010 U Ill L Rev 1339. Animals have only limited standing to bring cases, but 
they sometimes can. See, for example, Naruto v Slater, 888 F3d 418, 424–25 (9th Cir 2018) 
(finding that a crested macaque alleged facts sufficient to establish Article III standing 
because it was the apparent author and owner of selfies it took and may have suffered 
legally cognizable harms); Cetacean Community v Bush, 386 F3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir 2004) 
(stating that mere fact that plaintiffs were animals did not rule out possibility of standing). 
But the law also refuses to treat animals as anything other than property in many in-
stances. See, for example, Johnson v Douglas, 187 Misc 2d 509, 510–11 (NY Sup 2001) 
(refusing to allow emotional distress damages because dog was considered personal  
property). 
 320 See Emily Reynolds, The Agony of Sophia, the World’s First Robot Citizen Con-
demned to a Lifeless Career in Marketing (Wired, June 1, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/45S5-XEFK (weighing the implications of extending legal personhood to a 
greater number of robots in the future); The Global Race to Robot Law: 2nd Place, South 
Korea (Robotics Business Review, Sept 24, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2EUX-US3T 
(discussing South Korea’s “Robot Ethics Charter”). 
 321 See Charles Stross, Dude, You Broke the Future! (Charlie’s Diary, Dec 2017),  
archived at http://perma.cc/V3EA-5NCX. 
 322 Id. 
 323 Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 Wash U L Rev 887, 887, 897–901 
(2018). See also Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the 
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 Stan Tech L Rev 93, 105–08 (2015); Bayern, 108 
Nw U L Rev at 1495 (cited in note 172). 
 324 Consider Asimov’s three laws of robotics, Isaac Asimov, Runaround, in I, Robot 41, 
53 (Ballantine 1950), which would allow any person to kill a robot for any reason. Isaac 
Asimov clearly never anticipated Reddit. Trying to implement the three laws of robotics 
would leave the world strewn with the carcasses of robots killed by griefers. For an effort 
to write three human “laws” to regulate robots, see generally Jack M. Balkin, The Three 
Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 Ohio St L J 1217 (2017). 
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challenges is valuable and important in its own right. But doing 
so can also teach us some things about the law of remedies as it 
currently applies to people and corporations. 
First, much of remedies, like much of law, is preoccupied with 
fault—identifying wrongdoers and treating them differently. 
There may be good reasons for that, both within the legal system 
and in society as a whole. But it works better in some types of 
cases than in others. Our preoccupation with blame motivates 
many remedies, particularly monetary equitable relief. This pre-
occupation distorts damage awards, particularly when something 
really bad happens and there is not an obvious culprit. It also ap-
plies poorly to corporations, which don’t really have a unitary pur-
pose in the way a person might.325 It’s also costly, requiring us to 
assess blame in traffic cases that could otherwise be resolved 
more easily if we didn’t have to evaluate witness credibility. A 
fault-based legal system doesn’t work particularly well in a world 
of robots. But perhaps the problem is bigger than that: it might 
not work well in a world of multinational corporations either.326 
We should look for opportunities to avoid deciding fault, particu-
larly when human behavior is not the primary issue in a legal 
case.327 
A second lesson is the extent to which our legal remedies, 
while nominally about compensation, actually serve other pur-
poses, particularly retribution. We described remedies law at the 
outset of the paper as being about “what you get when you win.” 
But decades of personal experience litigating cases328 have rein-
forced the important lesson that what plaintiffs want is quite of-
ten something the legal system isn’t prepared to give. They may 
 
 325 For an argument that current methods of punishing corporations are ineffective 
and that corporations should face organizational remedies—the equivalent of rewriting 
their “code”—see Mihailis E. Diamantis, How to Punish a Corporation (working paper, 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/632P-432H. 
 326 We are by no means the first to have advanced this line of argument. See, for 
example, William S. Laufer, Corporate Culpability and the Limits of Law, 6 Bus Ethics Q 
311, 312–14 (1996). 
 327 See Shavell, A Fundamental Error in the Law of Torts *25–34 (cited in note 274). 
This does not mean, however, that we don’t need laws. Some have suggested that we won’t 
need rules or standards in the future because we can just rely on machine judgment to 
decide what the right thing to do is in any specific situation. See generally Anthony J. 
Casey and Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 Ind L J 1401 (2017). 
For the reasons we explained in Part I, we think that highly unlikely. Robots will cause 
all sorts of harm the legal system will want to remedy. See generally Dan L. Burk,  
Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U Chi L Rev 283 (2019) (explaining why algorithms won’t effec-
tively replace standards in many cases). 
 328 Lemley, not Casey. 
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want to be heard, they may want justice to be done, or they may 
want to send a message to the defendant or to others. Often what 
they want—closure, or for the wrong to be undone—is something 
the system not only can’t give them, but that the process of a law-
suit actually makes worse. The disconnect between what plain-
tiffs want and what the law can give them skews remedies law in 
various ways. Some do no harm: awards of nominal damages or 
injunctions that vindicate a position while not really changing the 
status quo. But we often do the legal equivalent of punching ro-
bots—punishing people to make ourselves feel better, even as we 
frequently deny compensation for real injuries. It’s just that it’s 
easier to see when it’s a robot you’re punching. 
A final lesson is that our legal system sweeps some hard prob-
lems under the rug. We don’t tell the world how much a human 
life is worth. We make judgments on that issue every day, but we 
do them haphazardly and indirectly, often while denying we are 
doing any such thing. We make compromises and bargains in the 
jury room, awarding damages that don’t reflect the actual injury 
the law is intended to redress but some other, perhaps impermis-
sible consideration.329 And we make judgments about people and 
situations in- and outside of court without articulating a reason 
for it, and often in circumstances in which we either couldn’t ar-
ticulate that decision-making process or in which doing so would 
make it clear we were violating the law. We swerve our car on 
reflex or instinct, sometimes avoiding danger but sometimes mak-
ing things worse. We don’t do that because of a rational cost- 
benefit calculus, but in a split-second judgment based on im- 
perfect information. Police decide whether to stop a car, and 
judges whether to grant bail, based on experience, instinct, and 
bias as much as on cold, hard data. 
Robots expose those hidden aspects of our legal system and 
our society. A robot can’t make an instinctive judgment about the 
value of a human life, or about the safety of swerving to avoid a 
squirrel, or about the likelihood of female convicts reoffending 
compared to their male counterparts. If robots have to make those 
decisions—and they will, just as people do—they will have to show 
their work. And showing that work will, at times, expose the tol-
erances and affordances our legal system currently ignores. That 
 
 329 See Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law 
and Justice, 2013 BYU L Rev 1103, 1129–31 (discussing this phenomenon with respect to 
jury nullification). 
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might be a good thing, ferreting out our racism, unequal treat-
ment, and sloppy economic thinking in the valuation of life and 
property. Or it might be a bad thing, particularly if we have to 
confront our failings but can’t actually do away with them. It’s 
probably both. But whatever one thinks about it, robots make ex-
plicit many decisions our legal system and our society have long 
decided not to think or talk about. For that, if nothing else,  
remedies for robots deserve serious attention. 
CONCLUSION 
Robots and AI systems will do bad things. When they do, our 
legal system will step in to try to make things right. But how it 
does so matters. Our remedies rules, unsurprisingly, aren’t writ-
ten with robots in mind. Adapting our existing rules to deal with 
the technology will require a nuanced understanding of the dif-
ferent ways robots and humans respond to legal rules. As we have 
shown, failing to recognize those differences could result in sig-
nificant unintended consequences—inadvertently encouraging 
the wrong behaviors, or even rendering our most important reme-
dial mechanisms functionally irrelevant. 
Robotics will require some fundamental rethinking of what 
remedies we award and why. That rethinking, in turn, will expose 
a host of fraught legal and ethical issues that affect not just robots 
but people, too. Indeed, one of the most pressing challenges raised 
by the technology is its tendency to reveal the tradeoffs between 
societal, economic, and legal values that many of us, today, make 
without deeply appreciating the downstream consequences. In a 
coming age where robots play an increasing role in human lives, 
ensuring that our remedies rules both account for these conse-
quences and incentivize the right ones will require care and im-
agination. We need a law of remedies for robots. But in the final 
analysis, remedies for robots may also end up being remedies for 
all of us. 
